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WHO DETERMINES WHEN ENOUGH IS
ENOUGH? REFOCUSING REGULATORY
LIMITATIONS ON BANKS'
COMPENSATION PRACTICES
HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER *
INTRODUCTION
Imagine bank' executives lining their pockets with the hard-earned
savings of American depositors. Even worse, envision bank executives
raiding the coffers of a bank on the brink of insolvency and taxpayer-
financed bailout. These images permeated the popular media and
financial press in the wake of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.
More importantly, these images provided the contextual background
for Congress's decision to strengthen the federal banking regulators"'
already broad authority to limit banks' compensation' practices.''
* Assistant Professor, Columbus School of law, The Catholic University of America.
1 1n this article, the term "bank" is used to refer both to commercial banks and savings
associations.
2 The federal banking agencies are: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"),
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), the Office of Thrift Supervision ("0"FS"),
and the Federal Reserve Board ("Fed"). The FDIC is the primary federal regulator for slate-char-
tered, commercial banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C.
1813(q)(3) (1996). The FDIC also has the ability, under certain circumstances, to bring en-
forcement actions against any insured bank and its officers, directrirs and whet: affiliated profes-
sionals. [2 U.S.C. § 1818(t) (1996). The OGG is the primary federal regulator for all nationally-
chartered commercial banks. 12 U.S.C, §§ 26, 93a (19911). The 0 -FS is the primary federal
regulator for savings institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1463 (1996). The Fed is the primary federal
regulator for bank holding companies and state-chartered, commercial banks that are members
of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. §§ 248, 1844 (1995). This article uses the terms
"regulator" or "agency" to refer to any or all of the four regulators.
3 The term "compensation" is defined in the recently released interagency Guidelines Estab-
lishing Standards for Safety and Soundness as
all direct and indirect payments or benefits, both cash and min-cash, granted lo or
for the benefit of any executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder,
including but not limited to payments or benefits derived from an employment
contract., compensation or benefit agreement, fee arrangement, perquisite, stock
option plan, postemploymem benefit, or other compensatory arrangement.
60 Fed. Reg. 35,674, 35,670 (1905). For a discussion of the Interagency Guidelines, see infra part
1.13.2.
' See infra parts
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In strengthening the banking regulators' hand, Congress rode the
wave of popular opinion. In 1989, Congress granted the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") the authority to repudiate con-
tracts,' including contracts relating to compensation, entered into by
banks for which the FDIC acted as receiver. 6
 In 1990, Congress passed
legislation granting the FDIC the authority to prohibit golden para-
chute payments' to bank executives and employees. 8 In 1991, Congress
directed the federal banking agencies to adopt regulations prescribing
standards for safety and soundness with respect to banks' compensa-
tion practices.° Also in 1991, Congress enabled the banking agencies
to limit bonuses paid to senior executive officers of certain undercapi-
talized institutions. 1 °
Congress's reaction to the possibly abusive compensation arrange-
ments of bank executives came not only in the wake of the savings and
loan crisis but also during a time of general economic recession and
growing criticism over excessive salaries paid to top corporate execu-
tives across all industries, not just bank executives." While debate
raged, and indeed continues today,P2 over the fairness of multimillion
See infra part
"'Me FDIC serves as receiver for failed commercial banks. Prior to December 31, 1995, the
Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") served as receiver for failed savings associations. The RTC
was dissolved on December 31, 1995, and the FDIC took over its role as receiver for all failed
depository institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 144Ia (m) (1) (1996). The term "receiver" means "receiver,
liquidating agent, conservator, commission, person, or other agency charged by law with the duty
of winding up the affairs of a bank or savings association or of a branch of a foreign bank." 12
U.S.C. § 1813(j). The FDIC is also the primary federal regulator for state-chartered, federally
insured banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. See supra note 2. The RTC
had no regulatory role. See supra note 2.
7 As discussed at length infra part 11.B, the statutory definition of a "golden parachute
payment" has three basic components: (1) there must be a "payment"; (2) the obligation of the
bank to make the payment to the institution-affiliated parties ("IAP") must be contingent on the
termination of the IAP's affiliation with the bank; and (3) the payment must be received on or
after a date on which the hank is insolvent, a receiver is appointed for the bank, the AFBA
determines that the hank is in a troubled condition, the hank has received a rating of four or
five under the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System or the FDIC has initiated a proceed-
ing against the bank to terminate or suspend its deposit insurance. The term "golden parachute
payments" does nut include payments under certain retirement plans, payments made pursuant
to a bona fide deferred compensation plan which the FDIC determines to be permissible and
payments made by reason of death or disability.
" See infra part 11.13.
" See. infra part I.R.Y.
See info part HA.
II See Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation —A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. Rim
937, 937-38 (1993).
12 See, g., DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT 98 (1992); ROBERT H. FRANK &	 J. COOK,
THE WINNER-TAKE-AL1, Socarry 67 (1995); Linda j. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A
Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. U. 59, 76 (1992); Elson, supra note 11,
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dollar compensation packages for corporate CEOs, especially during
times of massive corporate lay-offs, Congress did relatively little to
address the perceived problem in the context of non-bank corpora-
tions. Congress passed tax legislation prohibiting corporations from
deducting any compensation over one million dollars that is not re-
lated to performance.' 3 Perhaps more significantly, the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") adopted a rule requiring public cor-
porations to disclose the compensation paid to top executives and
amended its proxy rules to allow shareholder proposals regarding com-
pensation issues on ballots." While scholars and practitioners were quick
to offer solutions to the problem of "over compensation,"'' Congress
took no further action that would affect non-bank corporate America.
The changes in the banking laws, however, were dramatic. The
banking industry is only beginning to feel their full impact. In 1995
and 1996, the federal banking agencies adopted several regulations
implementing the new powers granted by Congress during this period.
The federal banking agencies have aggressively interpreted and en-
forced these new powers. While the insolvencies of the 1980s and early
1990s fade into history, the public's and the regulators' interest in
issues of compensation persists.' 6 Compensation practices have been
blamed, in part, for the very recent and highly publicized losses by
Barings and Daiwa banks.'''
at 979; Ira M. Mil!stein, The Professional Board, 50 Bus. LAw, 1427, 1436 (1995); Tom Herman,
Little-Noticed Item in Senate's Budget Alarms Some Firms: Plan Would Limit Tax Break for High
Compensation; Opposition Grows Quickly, WALL Sr. J., Nov. 2, 1995, at A4; Joann S. Lublin,
Executive Pay (A Special Report): The Great Divide: CEO Pay Keeps Soaring, Leaving Everybody Else
Further and Further Behind, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1996, at RI; Joann S. Lublin, Executive Pay (A
Special Report): Raking It In: CEO Pay h Soaring Again, Thanks to Rising Profits, Direcuffs' Pursuit
of Outside. Talent and Reduced Public. Criticism, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1995, at Rl.
w See 26 C.F.R. pi 1 (1996) (correction to final regulations); 60 Fed. Reg. 65,534 (1995)
(Final regulations relating to section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, added by the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993). Section 162(m) provides that a publicly-held
corporation is denied a deduction for compensation paid to a "covered employee" (includes the
CEO, plus the next four highest compensated officers) to the extent that the compensation
exceeds $1,000,000. This deduction limitation does not apply to "performance-based compensa-
tion" (remuneration payable solely (1) goals are determined by a qualified compensation
committee; (2) the terms of the compensation agreement are disclosed to, and approved by,
shareholders; and (3) the compensation committee certifies attainment of the goals and other
material terms). 6(1 Fed. Reg. 65,534-35.
14 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.402, 240, pt. 14 (1996).
"See infra part 1V.D.
16 See, e.g., Nikhil Deogun, First Union 'Takeover of First Fidelity to Bring Terracciano Large
Payments, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995, at MC (discussing Mr. Terracciano's pending annual salary
and bonus of not less than $2,000,000, regardless of whether or not he leaves First Union
(voluntarily or involuntarily)).
17
 Douglas E. Harris, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Capital Markets, Remarks Before the
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The question remains whether the laws passed by Congress, along
with the existing powers, and the implementation of the laws by the
regulators, are an appropriate response to alleged compensation abuses.
This issue is of particular importance in light of the relative lack
of regulation over the compensation practices of non-bank corpora-
tions—even corporations such as non-hank financial institutions—that
are in direct competition with banks. While the banking industry's
need to attract and retain talented managers is widely recognized,' 8
overreaching restrictions on banks' ability to compensate their employ-
ees could impede banks' efforts to compete with their non-bank com-
petitors in attracting the best talent.
In light of these developments, this article examines the banking
agencies' authority—both old and new—to regulate banks' compensa-
tion practices. The article considers whether the agencies' implemen-
tation of their statutory authority is appropriate. In evaluating the
appropriateness of regulation in this area, the regulators' mandate to
preserve the safety and soundness of banks is balanced against the
banks' need to compete in an increasingly competitive marketplace.' 9
Also, the banking agencies' activities in this area are viewed against the
backdrop of considerable legal and management scholarship address-
ing issues of compensation.
Fourth City of London Central Banking Conference (Nov. 20, 1995) (available from author);
Testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Before the Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services
of the U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 5, 1995) (available from Mc author) (Comptroller
cited changes to compensation practices as a way to avoid disasters such as those experienced at
13:wings and Daiwa); Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the
European Institute's International Roundtable Seminar (Apr. 28, 1995) (available from author)
[hereinafter Roundtable Remarks] (citing compensation practices as one of three issues raised
by collapse of Barings resulting from derivatives trading losses); see also James C. Allen, OCC
Moves to Lessen Risk of Emerging Markets Fiascos Series: 6. 120:246 As,. RANKER, Dec. 22, 1995, at
20; George M. Bollenbacher, Overcoming the Challenges of Building the "Expert Bank," 162:5 AM.
BANKER, Jan. 10, 1996, at 16; John R. Dorfman, Brokerage Firms Take Action to Detect Potential
Rogue Traders in Their Midst, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1995, al Cl; OCC Suggests' Review if Trader
Compensation Practices, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1996, at 25.
18
 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gallagher, 10 E.3d 416, 422-23 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that
legislative history of Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
("FIRREA"), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 183, indicates an intent to attract quality officers and directors);
Joint Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Standards for Safety and Soundness, 57 Fed.
Reg. 31,337 (1902) (stating that safety and soundness standards should not be unclear because
of the need to attract qualified management); see also Bollenbacher, supra note 17, at 16.
L 9 The Comptroller of the Currency described recently the "fundamental tradeoff' for his
agency as follows: "[To] balance safety and soundness concerns with the need to preserve the
national banking system in its role as a vital contributor to the economy of out' nation." Eugene
A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Town Hall of California (fitly 24,
1995) (transcript available from author).
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Parts I, Il and III of the article address the sources of the agencies'
authority to regulate banks' compensation practices. This authority to
regulate banks' compensation practices varies depending upon the
financial health of the institution. Predictably, the agencies' powers
expand as the health of the institution declines. Part I describes the
agencies' authority to regulate the compensation practices of an insti-
tution regardless of'its financial condition and explores the circumstances
under which the agencies are most likely to exercise that authority.'"
Part II examines the agencies' authority to regulate the compensation
practices of financially troubled institutions and the application of that.
authority in practice.2 ' Part Ill analyzes the FDIC's authority, when
acting as receiver for a failed institution, to repudiate contracts provid-
ing compensation. 2"
Following the examination of the agencies' regulatory authority,
part IV evaluates, on a comprehensive level, the regulators' approach
toward compensation.'" Part IV concludes that while the banking agen-
cies are appropriately interested in compensation practices because of
their potential impact on banks' safety and soundness, the agencies
would more effectively regulate in this area by focusing their attention
on the decision-making process that forms compensation plans rather
than attempts to regulate the content of such plans. In focusing primar-
ily upon content, the regulators have failed to address adequately the
fundamental causes of abusive compensation, i.e., the fact that com-
pensation decisions are made by self-interested members of manage-
ment. Limitations on the content of compensation plans—without
regard for the causes of abusive compensation—could prove detrimen-
tal to banks' ability to compete with non-bank rivals for quality leader-
ship and management. To the extent that these limitations cannot be
justified as a necessary means for preserving banks' safety and sound-
ness, such an approach does more harm than good.
I. CRADLE TO GRAVE AUTHORITY OVER ABUSIVE
COMPENSATION PRACTICES
The banking agencies are said to have "cradle to grave" authority
over banks. The term "cradle to grave" invokes the agencies' broad
authority over banks from their initial formation until their possible
20 See infra notes 24-167 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 168-237 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 238-87 and accompanying text..
2 '1 See infra notes 288-329 and accompanying text.
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demise. 24
 Part I addresses the agencies' authority to limit compensation
practices throughout the life and death of a banking institution. Unlike
the powers discussed in parts II and III, the supervisory authority
addressed in this part is available to the regulators regardless of the
institution's financial health. Although the powers discussed in this
part are available to the regulators regardless of a bank's financial
status, as a practical matter, these powers are used most often in the
cases in which the bank's safety and soundness are in question.
A. Formal Enforcement Powers
Congress vested the banking agencies with formal enforcement
powers that assist the agencies in preserving the safety and soundness
of insured banks.25
 Since the purpose and emphasis of these powers is
the preservation of a bank's financial integrity, these formal enforce-
ment powers are available to the banking agencies regardless of the
financial condition of the institution. 26
 While, as discussed below, the
agencies have the authority to bring formal enforcement actions for
violations of specific laws or regulations, this part focuses on the agen-
cies' broad authority to bring formal enforcement proceedings for
"unsafe or unsound banking practices."27
 Specific laws and regulations
limiting compensation practices are discussed in the remainder of part
I and in parts II and III.
1. Statutory Basis
Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act ("FDIA"), 28
 the appro-
priate federal banking agency ("AFBA") 29
 has the power to bring vari-
24
 Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145 (1982); Conference of State
Bank Supervisors v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 792 F. Supp. 837, 840 (D,D.C. 1992).
25
 See generally Lawrence G. Baxter, The Rule of Too Much Law! The New Safety/Soundness
Rulemaking Responsibilities of the Federal Banking Agencies, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REp. 210
(1993); Alfred J.T. Byrne & Martha L. Coulter, Safety and Soundness in Banking Reform: Implica-
tions for the Federal Deposit Insurer, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 679 (1991); Heidi Mandanis Schooner,
Fiduciary Duties' Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Prac-
tices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. Ray. 175, 187-201 (1995),
26 See, e.g., Hoffritan v. FDIC, 912 F.2d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1990) (the FDIC may issue a cease
and desist order whether or not the institution is insolvent).
27 See infra notes 45-79 and accompanying text (discussing "unsafe or unsound banking
practices").
28
 FIRRE.A significantly amended the FDIA and expanded the enforcement powers of the
federal banking agencies. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1996).
29
 The AFBA for a national bank is the OCC; for a slate bank that is a member of the Federal
Reserve System, it is the Fed; for a state bank that is not a member of the Federal Reserve System,
it is the FDIC; and for a savings institution, it is the OTS. Id. § 1813(q). Although the FDIC is
the AFBA only for state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC
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ous formal enforcement actions against banks and their institution-Milli-
ated parties ("IAP"), which include bank officers, directors, employees
and certain shareholders. 3° The agencies may use any of the following
administrative enforcement powers to address abusive compensation
practices: cease and desist powers (which can include the authority to
order restitution, reimbursement or indemnification); removal from
office; prohibition from participation in the banking industry; and civil
money penalties.''
The AFBA may issue a cease and desist order 52 against a bank or
an IAP for unsafe or unsound banking practices or violations of any
law, rule, regulation or any written agreement entered into with the
agency." The cease and desist power includes the authority to require
the respondent to make restitution or provide reimbursement, indem-
nification or guarantee against loss if the respondent was unjustly
enriched or acted in reckless disregard of the law, regulations or prior
order of the agency.' 4
retains enlbrcement authority over any bank or savings association that it insures. Id. §1818(t).
The FDIC must first recommend to the AFBA that the agency take enforcement action. See id, If
the AFBA does not, then the FDIC may bring the enforcement action upon a negative determi-
nation by the FDIC Board regarding the safety and soundness of the institution. Id. § 1818(0(2).
3DId. § 1813(u). The term institution-affiliated party also includes, under certain circum-
stances, certain professionals (e.g., attorneys, appraisers and accountants). Id. § 181300(4).
St Orders to cease and desist, to pay civil money penalties and for removal or prohibition
may he appealed to the appropriate United States Court of Appeals. Id. § 1818(h) (2). This
appellate review is governed by Chapter 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-700 (1996). The APA provides that agency action will be reversed only upon a court's
finding dim. the action was not supported by substantial evidence or is otherwise arbitrary and
capricious. Sunshine State Bank v. FDIC, 783 E2c1 1580, 1584 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A)); First. Nat'l Bank of Eden v. Comptroller of the Currency, 568 F.2d 610, 611 (11th
Cir. 1978) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)); see also First. Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 610 F.2d 1258, 1264
(5th Cir. 1980).
32 The issuance of the order is preceded by service of a notice of charges and a hearing. 12
U.S.C. 1818(b)(1).
" Id. Section 1818(b)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If, in the opinion of the appropriate Federal banking agency, any insured deposi-
tory institution, depository institution which has insured deposits, or any institn-
tion-afli hated party is engaging or has engaged, or the agency has reasonable cause
to believe that the depository institution or any institution-affiliated party is about
to engage, in an unsafe or unsound practice in conducting the business of such
depositary institution, or is violating or has vitibued, or the agency has reasonable
cause to believe that the depository institution or any institution-affiliated party is
about to violate, a law, rule, or regulation, or any condition imposed in writing by
the agency in connection with the granting of any application or other request by
the depository institution or any written agreement entered into with the agency,
the agency may issue and serve upon the depository institution or such party a
notice of charges in respect thereof'.
Id.
"Id.
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The AFBA possesses means of enforcement that permit the re-
moval of an IAP from office or the prohibition of an IAP from partici-
pation in the affairs of the bank. An lAP can be sanctioned for viola-
tions of law, regulation, unsafe or unsound practices or breaches of
fiduciary duty, if by reason of such violation, practice or breach, the
bank suffered, or will probably suffer, financial loss or other damage
or the interests of the bank have been, or could be, prejudiced, or the
IAP has received financial gain or other benefit and the violation,
practice or breach involves personal dishonesty or demonstrates willful
or continuing disregard by the IAP for the safety or soundness of the
bank." An lAP who is subject to a removal or prohibition order is also
prohibited from participating in the conduct of the affairs of any
insured depository institution unless the IAP receives written consent
from the agencies. 36
Banks and IAPs confront potential liability for three tiers of civil
money penalties." The first-tier penalty may reach up to $5000 for each
day the violation continues, the second tier is up to a sobering $25,000
per day, and the third tier is up to an alarming $1,000,000 per clay."
The first-tier civil money penalty is likely the most potent source of
liability. It includes none of the standards of culpability required in the
other two tiers (i.e., knowing or reckless conduct). 39
 The first-tier civil
money penalty can be imposed on a bank or IAP for any violation of
law, regulation, certain final orders or any written agreement with the
agency.°
A bank or IAP is liable for a second-tier civil money penalty of up
to $25,000 per clay for violating any law, regulation, certain final orders
or any written agreement with the agency, recklessly engaging in an
unsafe or unsound practice or breaching any fiduciary duty, if such
violation, practice or breach is part of a pattern of misconduct, or
causes or is likely to cause more than minimal loss to the bank, or
results in pecuniary gain to the bank or TAP.'" Third-tier civil money
penalties of up to $1,000,000 per day42
 can be imposed on a bank or
55
	§ 1818(e)(1). The statute provides for notice and hearing before removal. Id.
1818(e)(4).
3" M.	 1818(c)(7).
37
 12 U.S.C. § 1818(0(2). An agency hearing is available if the respondent requests a hearing
within 20 days after notice of the penalty. Id. § 1818(i) (2) (1-1).
34
 M.§ 1818(i) (2).
' See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory requirements for
second-tier and third-tier civil money penalties).
4"The penalty is $5,000 for each day during which such violation continues." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(i)(2)(A).
41 14. § 1818(1) (2) (B).
12
 The maximum penalty for a third-tier violation that can be imposed on an 1AP is
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lAP who knowingly violates any law, regulation, certain final orders or
any written agreement with the agency, engages in an unsafe or un-
sound practice, or breaches any fiduciary duty, and knowingly or reck-
lessly causes a substantial loss to the bank or a substantial pecuniary
gain or other benefit to the bank or the IAP by reason of such violation,
practice or breach."
2. Application of Formal Enforcement Powers to
Compensation Practices
As a matter of practice, the agencies use all their formal enforce-
ment powers to limit banks' compensation practices."' The agencies
employ their powers in two ways. First, the agencies target abusive
compensation practices as the basis for the initiation of the enforce-
ment proceeding. For example, an agency may claim that payment of
an excessive salary to a bank's chief executive officer was an unsafe or
unsound banking practice that serves as a statutory basis for the cease
and desist proceeding. Second, the agencies bring cease and desist
proceedings on the basis of violations of law or unsafe or unsound
banking practices that may or may not include allegations of abusive
compensation practices, but incorporate in the cease and desist order
limitations on the bank's ability to make compensation determina-
tions. The following text discusses the agencies' use of the formal
enforcement powers in these two distinct manners.
a. Compensation Arrangements that Constitute Unsafe or Unsound
Banking Practices
While violations of specific laws or regulations may serve as the
basis for a formal enforcement proceeding," the agencies also have at
their disposal the general principle of unsafe or unsound banking
practices as a basis for such proceedings.'" The agencies often utilize
$1,000,000; for a bank, the maximum penalty is the lesser of $3,000,000 or one percent of the
bank's total assets. Id. § 1818(i) (2) (0).
43 Id. § I 818(i) (2) (C). A director may also be subject to a third-tier civil money penalty fin -
knowingly breaching any fiduciary duty and knowingly or recklessly causing a substantial loss to
the hank or a substantial pecuniary gain or benefit to the director by reason of breach. Id.
41 The agencies appear to use the cease and desist power most in addressing these issues.
Although, when the compensation abuses involve self-dealing the agencies arc likely to utilize
their power to remove IAP or prohibit participation in the industry. See infra text accompanying
notes 72-79 (discussing cases involving allegations of self-dealing).
45 Particular laws or regulations limiting compensation practices are discussed infra parts 1.13.,
' 16 "Unsafe or unsound banking practices" is the statutory trigger for each of the formal
milbrcument proceedings discussed 511pm part I, except first-tier civil money penalties.
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unsafe or unsound banking practices as the statutory basis for enforce-
ment proceedings targeting compensation practices.
The term "unsafe or unsound banking practices" has never been
defined by Congress, but the courts generally conclude that the phrase
means "conduct deemed contrary to accepted standards of banking
operations which might result in abnormal risk or loss to a banking
institution or shareholder."47
 Although courts generally defer to the
agencies in the interpretation of the phrase, 48
 there is one significant
judicial limitation on this otherwise broad principle. In Gulf Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the prin-
ciple of unsafe or unsound banking practices was limited to "practices
with a reasonably direct effect on [a financial institution's] financial
soundness."49
 The Third and Ninth Circuits have cited favorably the
Gulf Federal limitation. 5° Therefore, any analysis of whether conduct
constitutes unsafe or unsound banking practices should include an
analysis of whether the practices have a reasonably direct effect on the
bank's financial integrity.
{7
 This definition was originally adopted by the Eighth Circuit; the court attributed the
wording of the definition to the Comptroller of the Currency. First Nat'l Bank of Eden v.
Department of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 6I0, 611 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). The following
decisions rely on the definition provided in Eden: In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 927 (3d Cir. 1994);
Northwest Nat'l Bank v. United States, 917 F.2d 1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 1990); First Nat'l Bank v.
Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 685 (5th Cir. 1983); First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 61(1
F.2d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 1980).
Some courts rely upon an alternative, but virtually identical, definition, which defines 
-unsafe
or unsound banking practices" as "any action, or lack of action, which is contrary to generally
accepted standards of prudent operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued,
would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the agencies
administering the insurance funds." See, e.g., Seidman, 37 F.3d at 926-27; Simpson v. OTS, 29 F.3d
1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1994); MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900
F,2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1990). The language of this alternative definition is traced to a memoran-
dum written by a former chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. See Financial
Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act cf 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 and S. 3695 Before the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1966); 112 CONC. Rac. 26,474
(1966) (memorandum submitted by John Horne, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board). For a complete discussion of the definition of "unsafe or unsound banking practices,"
see Schooner, supra note 25, at 187-201.
48
 Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, 01'S, 934 F,2d 1127, 1145-46 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 937 (1992); Smith, 610 F.2d at 1264; Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann,
613 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
49
 Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal More Loan Bank Bd., 651 F2d 259, 264 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
"Seidman, 37 F.3d at 927; Hoffman v. FDIC, 912 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1990). The agencies,
however, have not necessarily embraced the decisions' limitation on unsafe or unsound banking
practices. See generally Schooner, supra note 25, at 193-94.
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The following is a discussion of the common categories of cases 5 '
in which compensation practices give rise to agency action based upon
unsafe or unsound banking practices. The first category involves cases
in which the agencies claim that the amount of the compensation paid
was an unsafe or unsound banking practice. These cases involve claims
that the compensation is "excessive." The second category involves
cases in which the incentive provisions of an employment contract, e.g.,
bonus payments, give rise to a claim of unsafe or unsound banking
practices. These cases do not necessarily focus on the amount of the
compensation paid, but rather the form and method of payment. The
third category of cases involves self-dealing transactions as unsafe or
unsound banking practices. These cases tend to focus on the circum-
stances surrounding the underlying decision to pay compensation to
a bank employee.
1. Amount of Compensation as an Unsafe or Unsound
Banking Practice
A common agency claim of unsafe or unsound banking practices
in the compensation area involves the agencies' characterization of the
amount of compensation arrangements as "excessive."52 The following
discussion first examines the agencies' factual conclusion that compen-
sation is "excessive," and then explores the application of such facts to
the principle of unsafe or unsound banking practices. 53
51 Of course, individual cases could fall into more than one of the categories listed.
52 An often cited Eighth Circuit case confirms that the payment of "excessive" salaries and
bonuses can constitute an unsafe or unsound banking practice. Eden, 568 F.2d at 611. This case
provides no indication of the OCC's rationale for determining that the compensation was excessive.
53 Because many enforcement cases are settled by consent, with little public record of the
underlying facts or agency analysis, it is often difficult to assess either the agencies' determination
that the compensation was "excessive" or the determination that "excessive" compensation con-
stitutes an unsafe or unsound banking practice. For examples of cease and desist orders entered
by consent of the respondents which include allegations of "excessive" compensation as unsafe
or unsound banking practices but do not provide an analysis as to the reasons lOr the legal con-
clusion, see Corporate Bank, FDIC-94-54b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,975,
C-3646, C-3646 (May 4, 1994) (operating with an employment agreement and a settlement
agreement providing for an excessive amount of severance pay is unsafe or unsound); Corporate
Bank, FDIC-93-31b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,958, C-3615, C-3617 (Mar.
15, 1994) (operating with employment agreements providing for excessive amounts of severance
pay is unsafe or unsound); Michael S. Lang, No. Al' 93-32, 1993 OTS DD LEXIS *32 (Apr. 27,
1993) (Decision and Order) (paying "improper and excessive dividends, bonuses and compen-
sation"); Bank of Walnut, FDIC-91-369h, FDIC EnfOrcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,647,
C-2729, C-2731 (Sept. 29, 1992) ("[ol perating in such a manner as to provide excessive com-
pensation to [two bank officials]" is unsafe or unsound); Green Mountain Bank, FDIC-92-48b
(Feb. 14, 1992) ("maintaining a director deferred compensation plan providing excessive compen-
sation for certain directors" is unsafe or unsound), available in WESTLAW, FFIN-FDIC Database;
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With regard to the determination that compensation is "exces-
sive," the agencies often make comparisons of the questioned compen-
sation to both external market factors and internal financial resources.
For example, the agencies compare the compensation paid by the
respondent bank to what other banks pay for similar services." Simi-
larly, the agencies may relate the compensation to the fair market value
of the services rendered. 55
 Moreover, the agencies relate the amount
paid to the bank's financial condition, i.e., the bank's net losses during
the same period.56
Western Community Bank, FDIC-91-90b, FDIC EnfOrcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,210,
-939, C-040 (Apr. 3, 1991) (operating with consulting agreements that provide $125,000
payments to two bank officials "over a period of three years for services relating to the operation
of the Bank's consumer finance division" is unsafe or unsound); Desert. Sun Bank, FDIG90-175b,
FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,109, C-522, C-524 (Aug. 31, 1990) ("operating
with a consulting agreement between the Bank and its President and Chief Executive Officer
which provide [sic] for excessive life insurance benefits and compensation upon retirement" is
unsafe or unsound); Chireno State Bank, FDIC-90-32b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders
I 10,059, 0-292, C-293 (Mar. 30, 1990) ("paying excessive comnintee fees to directors" is unsafe
or unsound).
5'r
	 one case, the FDIC found that the bank's payment of an excessive management fee in
the amount of $276,300 was an unsafe or mist Hind banking practice. In rc * * *, FDIC Enforce-
ment Decisions and Orders 1 5003, A-25, A-35 (July 14, 1980). in reaching this conclusion, the
FDIC adopted the decision of the Administrative Law judge ("AEJ") in the case. The ALJ
concluded that the batik was paying "considerably more fOr management services than most
banks in the state in spite of its poor financial condition." Id. at A-30.
55 See Bay Bank & Trust Co., FDIG93-2202h, FDIC Enhircement Decisions and Orders
1 10,945, C-3585, C-3586 (Feb. 11, 1994) (paying compensation "in excess of the reasonable
compensation for such services both in relation to the Bank's ability to pay such compensation
and in relation to the fair market value of the service rendered or to be rendered to the Bank"
was an unsafe or unsound banking practice). Cf. * * *. FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders
I 5003, A-25, A-30 (July 14, 1980) (rejecting hank's argument that AA's analysis failed to take
into consideration value of services rendered and finding that bank could not afford fee "regard-
less of the value of the services").
56 Capital Bank, FDIC-91-60b (Nov. 4, 1991) (ALl's decision) (concluding that the payment
of bonuses to two senior executive officers during a time when the bank had negative income
and a poor capital position was an unsafe or unsound banking practice), available in WE,STLAW,
FFIN-FDIC Database; * * *, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 5003, at A-35 (recom-
mending that FDIC conclude that bank's net loss of $156,900 after taxes during three year period
was "caused primarily" by payment of excessive management fee during same period); see also
Richard D. Donohoo, FDIG92-250e, FDIG92-251e, and FDIG92-252k, FDIC Enforcement De-
cisions and Orders 1 5225, A-2583-84 (July 5, 1995) (golden parachute contracts were unsafe
or Unsound banking practices where such contracts represented a liability for the hank of 22%
of the bank's equity capital).
Several consent orders contain language that supports the conclusion that the FDIC views
the bank's financial condition as a key element in determining whether compensation is exces-
sive. .See, e.g., Somersworth Bank, FDIG91-315b (Oct. 7, 1991) ("paying excessive salaries, bo-
nuses, and/or cash dividends in relation to the Bank's net income and/rir capital position"),
available in WESTIAW, FFIN-FDIC Database; Midcomuy Bank & Trust Co., FDIC-90-232b, FDIC
Enforcement Decisions and Orders I 10,127, C-608, C-609 (Nov. 1, 1900) ("paying excessive
cash bonuses and otherwise inadequately controlling overhead expenses in relation to the bank's
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While the agencies' decisions and orders provide little guidance
as to the reasoning supporting the conclusion that excessive compen-
sation can be an unsafe or unsound banking practice, the agencies'
utilization of these comparisons in cases involving claims of "excessive"
compensation is consistent with the definition of unsafe or unsound
banking practices generally adopted by the courts. 57 Comparison of the
compensation in question to external factors such as the fair market
value of the services or the amounts paid by other, similarly situated
banks, could satisfy the part of the definition that requires that the
conduct be "contrary to accepted standards of banking operations.""
The fact that the conduct is contrary to accepted standards, however, is
not alone enough to satisfy the definition. The conduct must also be such
that "might result in abnormal risk or loss to the banking institution."'"
Those cases that relate the excessive compensation to the bank's net
losses during the same period seem to address that part of the definition.
The cases in which the agencies tie the abusive compensation
practices to the bank's net losses 60 seem to meet the Gulf Federal require-
ment that unsafe or unsound banking practices have a "reasonably
direct effect on [a financial institution's] financial soundness.'"il Pre-
sumably, however, in some cases involving excessive compensation or
other kinds of abusive compensation practices, the Gulf Federal limita-
tion, if followed by the agencies or adopted by the reviewing court,
may prove problematic for the agencies. Certainly, if the respondent
bank is already financially troubled, an agreement to pay "excessive"
compensation to bank officials has the potential to threaten the bank's
solvency. Rarely, however, would excessive compensation arrangements—
even the most abusive—threaten the insolvency of a financially healthy
institution.
ii. Incentive Provisions as an Unsafe or Unsound
Banking Practice
Like many other businesses, banks often utilize financial incen-
tives to attract, retain and motivate their employees. These incentives
net income and/or capital position"); Norwood Co-op. Bank, FD1C-90-208b, FDIC Enforcement
Decisions and Orders 11 10,121, C.-571, C-572 (Oct. 12, 1090) ("paying excessive cash bonuses
and otherwise inadequately controlling discretionary overhead expenses in relation to the Bank's
net income and/or capital position").
57 See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 47.
59 See supra text accompanying note 47.
61) See Nnpra note 56 and tICCOni pitying text.
6E See supra text accompanying note 49.
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take many forms. For example, a bank might implement a bonus plan
tied to certain indicators of productivity to encourage bank employees
to work hard. Other examples include a bank's execution of employ-
ment contracts with certain executives that ensure that the executives
will receive a lump sum of cash if they are terminated within a certain
period without cause. These contracts are designed to facilitate banks'
efforts to attract or retain talented management even in the face of an
impending merger (in which case current management are likely to
lose their jobs) or impending insolvency (in which case no jobs are
left). Particularly in recent years, the agencies have targeted the incen-
tive provisions of employment contracts as unsafe or unsound banking
practices.62
 An obvious example of an incentive plan that would con-
stitute an unsafe or unsound banking practice is a bank's agreement
to pay commissions to its lenders based on the size of the loans made
where the individuals approving the loans (and receiving the commis-
sions) are also the individuals performing the credit underwriting.°
This would create an incentive for loan officers to agree to lend the
bank's money without regard, or with little regard, for the credit quality
of the loan because of the commissions paid. 64
Many cases in this area involve the termination provisions of an
employment contract. In the FDIC decision, In re Ronald L. Blunt, the
bank executed an employment agreement with a bank employee which
had no provision for termination for cause and did not allow the bank
to terminate the employee's compensation for failure to perform or
provide services.° The FDIC found the bank's execution of the agree-
"These cases are similar to the "excessive" compensation cases discussed supra part 1.A.1.
because they also deal with the terms of the employment contract. They are different, however,
in that the focus is not on the amount paid, but on what events trigger payment.
6:3 See, e.g., John Henderson, jr, No. AP 95-22, 1995 OTS DD LEXIS, at *9 (Apr. 12, 1995)
(Notice of Charges). The OTS alleges that "[a] compensation arrangement was an unsafe or
unsound practice because it resulted in the loan originators receiving a direct and significant
benefit from approval of . . . loans they originated and greater compensation for larger loans,
while, at the same time, allowing them to have a substantial role in loan underwriting and loan
administration." Id. at *53.
A reasonable analogy can be drawn from the concerns regarding the practices of paying
traders in the Borings and Diawa bank disasters. See, e.g., Ludwig, Roundtable Remarks, supra
note 17; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial  Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Comm.
on Ban-king and Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 5, 1995) (testimony
of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency); Harris, supra note 17; see also Allen, supra
note 17; Dorfman, supra note 17, at Cl; OCC Suggests Review of Trader Compensation Practices,
FIN. REG. REV., Jan. 1, 1996, at 25.
65 Ronald L. Blunt, FDIC-93-24c&b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 15210, A-
2391 (Jan. 4, 1994).
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ment to be an unsafe or unsound banking practice.'"' The FDIC's
decision and order provide little insight into the agency's analysis of
the facts of this cases' Applying the definition of unsafe or unsound
banking practices, one could reasonably assume that employment con-
tracts with such woefully deficient termination provisions are "contrary
to accepted standards of banking operations"--meeting the first part
of the definition of unsafe or unsound banking practices. The second
part of the definition, i.e., conduct that "might result in abnormal risk
or loss to the banking institution,"69 appears satisfied since the employ-
ment contract allowed Blunt to continue to receive salary and benefits
despite the fact that Blunt had, among other things, been prohibited
from participating in the banking industry. The risk or loss to the bank
is perhaps abnormal because of the ongoing nature of the loss—the
bank was obligated to continue to pay Blunt no matter what he did.
There is no way to determine whether the facts of this case are consis-
tent with the Gulf Federal requirement that the conduct must have a
"reasonably direct effect on [a financial institution's] financial sound-
ness.""' As discussed above, this determination will depend upon the
financial condition of the bank. 71
Self-Dealing as an Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practice
Perhaps the most serious compensation cases involve situations in
which the agencies allege that bank executives put their own interests
before the banks' in making decisions to set their own compensation."
life
	 at A-2392. In addition to ordering the bank to rescind the employment agreement,
the FDIC ordered Bhmt to pay restitution in the amount of all unearned compensation. Id. at
A-2393. For examples of cease and desist orders entered by consent that find operation with an
employment agreement containing "imprudent termination provisions" is an Unsafe or unsound
banking practice, see Corporate Bank, FDIC-94-54b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders
1 10,975, A-3646 (May 4, 1994); Corporate Bank, FDIC-93-31b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions
and Orders ¶, 10,958, A-3615 (Mar, 15, 1994).
The decision merely states that the Board adopts the Alls conclusion that this was unsafe
or unsound. Id.
"See supra text accompanying note 47.
69
 See supra text accompanying note 47.
" See supra text accompanying note 49.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 45 -67,
72 A bank's pending failure apparently provides an opportune time for such problems to
arise. See, e.g., United Say. Ass'n of Tex,, 1995 OTS OD LEXIS 29 (Dec. 26, 1995) (Notice of
Charges) (directors and officers of failing thrift initiated lavish bonus and severance plans);
Robert Gillam, 1994 grs DD LEXIS 39 (Sept. 30, 1994) (Decision and Order) (CEO of insolvent
thrift received $177,000 plus other benefits and caused board to establish $300,000 legal defense
fund without regulatory approval).
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This conduct is often characterized as self-dealing or a breach of
fiduciary duty." In Hoffman v. FDIC" the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the FDIC's issuance of a cease
and desist order that directed Harold A. Hoffman, president of Alaska
Continental Bank, to repay almost $62,000 that he had received in a
buyout of his employment contract with the bank. The court agreed
with the FDIC's finding that, given the ailing condition of the bank,
this was an unsafe or unsound banking practice and a breach of
fiduciary duty.''`' The court explained that given the bank's precarious
financial condition, "it was hardly prudent to decide that the best thing
for [the bank] and its assets was to buy out [the director's] contract,
because he had decided to abandon a rapidly sinking ship." 76
For examples of compensation cases in which the unsafe or unsound banking practices
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty or self-dealing, see Jameson v. FDIC, 931 F.2d 290, 291 (5th
Cir. 1991) (bank vice president's receipt of bonus not authorized by bank's board and his
concealment of bonus on the bank's records was breach of fiduciary duty); Richard 1). Donohoo,
FDIC-92-250c, FD1G92-251e, and FDIC-92-252k, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders
If 5225, A-257l, A-2584 (July 5, 1995) (approval of golden parachute contracts was breach of
fiduciary duty where beneficiaries of such contracts voted for their approval and where there was
no valid business purpose for contracts); Stephens Sec. Bank, FD1C-89-234b, FDIC Enforcement
Decisions and Orders 5168, A-1782, A-1790 (Aug. 9, 1991) (bank chairman's receipt of loan
origination fees was self-dealing); Gilbert D. Hill, OCC EA No. 582, 1991 OCC Enforcement
Decisions LEXIS 345 (Apr. 16, 1991) (Notice of Assessment of Civil Penalties) (CEO, CEO's
spouse, and hoard chairman paid and/or received excessive salaries and bonuses, fees, and other
unsubstantiated payments; CEO also withdrew $60,000 from deferred compensation plan without
board authorization); Bank of Salem, FDIG89-229b (Feb. 28, 1991) (bank chairman's practice
of conditioning loan approvals and extension on his receipt of fixed fee was breach of fiduciary
duty), available in WESTLAW, FFIN-FD1C Database. See generally Schooner, supra note 25, at
207-08 (discussing breaches of fiduciary duty as unsafe or unsound banking practices).
7'1 912 F.2d 1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 1990).
75 1d. at 1174.
76 Id. at 1175. The court rejected the director's argument that he should have been allowed
to show that-the bank was not insolvent ;it the - time of the payment, since at the time "it was most
apparent that [the hank's] assets must be preserved." Id. It is important to bear in mind that a
bank officer's attempts to protect his or her own interests when his or her bank is in a troubled
condition is not always subject to regulatory sanction. In a decision conspicuously limited to its
facts, the Board of the FDIC rejected the FDIC Enforcement Counsel's claim that a bank executive
engaged in unsafe or unsound banking practices by participating in a compensation arrangement
that entailed the escrow of severance benefits on the executive's behalf. Pettinari, FDIC-91-2841),
FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders II 5188, A-2131, A-2131 (Nov. 17, 1992). In Peilinari,
the respondents entered into employment agreements which provided continued salary and
benefits if their employment contracts were terminated by the bank without cause or by the
respondents with cause. Id. at A-2132. In addition, the bank's board created an escrow account
at another financial institution, funded with bank assets, to provide the severance benefits. Id.
On July 3, 1990, one of the respondents was informed that the bank would he closed on July 6,
1990. Id. On July 6, 1990, the escrow accounts were closed and checks were issued to the
respondents in the amount due under their employment agreements. Id. The board's decision
rejecting an order of restitution indicates that normally the conduct surrounding this case would
be problematic and indicates that it is only the special circumstances of this case that caused the
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Similarly, in Magee v. Greenspan, 77 the Federal Reserve (the "Fed")
alleged that Magee, the bank's chief executive officer and chairman of
the board, paid himself $455,450 in addition to his salary from a
miscellaneous expense account without approval of, or disclosure to,
the bank's hoard of directors:8 It is difficult to conceive of a clearer
case of a bank executive putting his own interests before the bank's in
making decisions regarding his own compensation:" The Fed sought
to remove Magee from office and the court denied his motion for
preliminary injunction of the proceedings.
b. Limits on Compensation Practices in Cease and Desist Orders
Whether or not compensation practices form the basis of the
enforcement proceedings, such practices can be implicated in the
remedial measures imposed on a bank in a cease and desist order. For
example, an agency might bring an enforcement action alleging that
lax management and lending practices constituted an unsafe or un-
sound banking practice. Despite the fact that compensation practices
may or may not have been involved in the allegations, 8" the agency may
include corrective measures which address issues of compensation in
the cease and desist order.8 ' These corrective measures, aimed toward
compensation practices, often appear in conjunction with other meas-
FDIC Board to dismiss the charges. Id. at A-2133. The decision did not delineate the special
circumstances involved. See id.
77 808 F. Stipp. 847 (D.D,C. 1991).
79 Id. at 848. The Fed also alleged that Magee arranged for Gaylon Lawrence, a management
consultant to the hank, to receive $266,100 over the payment set in his consulting contract. Id.
79 See also Simpson v. OTS, 29 F.3d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1999) (relying, in part, upon
Hoffman). In Simpson, the OTS charged that Simpson's acts—among other things, making it
profit-sharing distribution (totalling $529,500) to himself (of $105,000) and other officers and
managers, when no profits should have been distributed—constituted willful disregard for the
thrift's safety and soundness and a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 1421. The court finuul
inapplicable Simpson's claim that the thrift remained solvent at all times. id. at 1423. 'The
unsound business.practices committed by Simpson threatened Cascade's solvency by improperly
dissipating its assets, thereby weakening its financial stability and undermining the interests and
confidence of Cascade's depositors." Id.
8° As discussed supra note 53, because so many enforcement actions are settled by consent,
often it is difficult to determine what types of activities led to the agencies' initiation of the
proceedings. The cases discussed in this part were virtually all settled by consent and may or may
not have involved allegations concerning compensation. The premilile of the consent order will
typically summarize the allegations. These summaries, however, are generally phrased in such
broad terms that little is revealed regarding the underlying facts of the case.
91 The banking agencies have broad discretion in fashioning appropriate remedies. junco v.
Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1393 (9th Cir. 1982); see also First State Rank v. FDIC, 770 17.2d 81, 82
(6th Cir. 1985) (FDIC's decision to issue cease and desist order is reviewed tinder arbitrary and
capricious standard),
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ures targeting poor management practices and high overhead ex-
penses. The following text details the corrective measures addressing
compensation: first, those measures addressing a bank's existing com-
pensation practices and, second, those aimed at shaping a bank's
future practices. 52
i. Orders Limiting Existing Bank Compensation Practices
The types of corrective measures involving banks' existing com-
pensation practices in cease and desist orders range from the very
broad to the very specific. Usually, the limitations are directed towards
senior management or the board of directors. An example of a broad
corrective measure is the agencies' limitation of a bank's ability to
enter into employment agreements." Another broad measure involves
the agencies' imposition of limitations on salaries or compensation
packages offered to bank employees. For example, the agencies may
require the prior written consent of the agency for any increase in
compensation, 84 or they may condition salary increases over a certain
amount on the prior consent of the agency," or they may ban increases
82
 Any given cease and desist order may, of course, contain any number of limitations on
compensation practices. The discussion below is intended to provide a synthesis of the types of
limitations that typically appear, alone or in concert. Some of the cases cited in this part involved
compensation practices as part of the allegations that served as the factual basis for the initiation
of the proceedings, but many of the cases did not explicitly mention compensation practices as
part of the factual basis.
83
 Bank of New England-West, Nat'l Ass'n, OCC EA No. 77, 1990 OCC Enforcement Decisions
LEX1S 58, at *5 (May 11, 1990) ("Prior to entering into any new employment ... agreements,
or renewing or extending any such existing agreements with the Bank's senior officers the
Bank shall provide the Deputy Comptroller with thirty (30) days prior written notice and the
Deputy Comptroller shall have the authority to veto such agreements."); Connecticut Bank &
Trust, Nat'l Ass'n, OCC EA No. 57, 1990 OCC Enforcement Decisions LEXIS 60, at *2 (Apr. 16,
1990) (same).
Citizens Western Bank, FDIC-91-35b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 10,238,
C-1017, C-1021 (May 14, 1991) (no increases or additional compensation for directors or senior
executive officers without prior written consent of FDIC Regional Director and State Bank
Commissioner).
85 See, e.g., Community Bank, FDIC-94-134b (Oct. 5, 1994), available in WESTLAW, FFIN-
FDIC Database (no increases for senior executive officers or directors "in an amount exceeding
one hundred five (105) percent of the annual compensation for that officer or director approved
by the board of directors as of December 31, 1993 without prior written consent of the [FDIC)
Regional Director"); Bank of San Francisco, FDIG93-177b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and
Orders 1 10,863, —3386, —3391 (Aug. 19, 1993) (no increases for "any senior executive officer
at a rate exceeding that officer's average rate of compensation ... during the 12 calendar months
preceding the calendar month in which the Bank became undercapitalized" without prior written
approval of the FDIC); Maritime Bank, FD1C-92-339b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders
1 10,676, C-2866, C-2872 (Nov. 24, 1992) (no increases over 105% for senior bank officers or
directors in 1993 and in subsequent years no increases over 105% without prior written approval
September 1996] LIMITING BANKS' COMPENSATION PRACTICES	 879
altogether. 86
 The imposition of such limitations upon non-bank corpo-
rations is unimaginable. 87
The agencies also impose more specific limitations like requiring
the bank to obtain the consent of the agency prior to making bonus
payments.88
 An FDIC consent order provides some insight to the factors
that the FDIC may deem important to the determination of whether
to allow a bank to pay a bonus. In In re Bank of Wallowa County, 89 the
consent order read:
of FDIC Regional Director and state bank commissioner); South Bay Bank, FDIC-92-299b, FDIC
Enforcement Decisions and Orders ¶ 10,653, C-2770, C-2776 (Oct. 6, 1992) (no increases in
compensation for any senior officer or director for two years and none without advance approval
by the FDIC in subsequent years).
86
 Security State Bank, FDIC-90-33h, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders ¶ 10,055,
C-279, C-279 (Mar. 16, 1990) ("Bank shall not . . . increase in any manner whatsoever, salaries
or other compensation, including, without limitation, directors' fees . . .").
87 One area in which the federal government does intrude upon corporate compensation is
in the federal procurement process. Although the regulations do not attempt to limit the amount
that—or the manner in which—employees can he paid, the government limits the amount that
it will compensate contractors for personal services through the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR"), 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-06 (1996). The regulation's "cost
principles" instruct that compensation for personal services is "allowable" (in other words,
reimbursable) only to the extent that it meets criteria and requirements set out in the regulations.
Id. The specific cost principle addresses, among other things, the "reasonableness" of the com-
pensation, id. § 31.205-06(b), bonus and incentive compensation, id. § 31.205-06(f), and de-
ferred compensation, id. § 31.205-06(k). For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see Joinsr
CIBIN1C, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., COST REIMBURSEMENT CoN . ricacrriNG, 785-817 (2d ed. 1993).
Another interesting analogy is discussed with regard to the congressionally-chartered institutions,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See, e.g., Jennifer Corbett & John Conner, New Agency Gears Up to
Scrutinize Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Officials' Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1996, at A13.
88
 See, e.g., Bank of San Francisco, FDIC-93-177b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders
¶ 10,863, A-3386, A-3390-91 (Aug. 19, 1993) (bank shall not "pay any bonus to any senior
executive officer" without prior written approval of the FDIC); Midland Bank, FDIC-93-11913 (May
28, 1993) (bank shall not pay management bonuses without prior written consent of state bank
commissioner and FDIC regional director), available in WESTLAW, FFIN-FDIC Database; First
Int'l Bank, FDIC-92-82b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders ¶ 10,587, C-2506 (July 9,
1992) ("Bank shall not pay a bonus ... to ... any executive officer of the Bank without providing
thirty (30) days written notice of such proposed action to the [FDIC] Regional Director . . .");
Bank of Westtninister, FDIC-92-143b (May 20, 1992) ("Bank shall receive the prior approval of
the [FDIC] Regional Director for the payment to management of bonuses of any kind and nature
whatsoever . . .''), available in WESTLAW, FFIN-FDIC Database; Midcounty Bank & Trust Co.,
FDIG90-232b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders ¶ 1(1,127, C-608, C-615 (Nov. 1, 1990)
("Bank shall not pay a bonus ... . . . any office, director, employee or related organization
without providing thirty (30) clays written notice of such proposed action to the [FDIC] Regional
Director and the [state bank commissioner] . . . .''); Norwood Co-op. Bank, FDIC-90-208b, FDIC
Enforcement Decisions and Orders ¶ 10,121, C-571, C-580 (Oct. 12, 1990) (same); Security State
Bank, FDIG90-33b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders ¶ 10,055, C-279, C-279 (Mar. 16,
1990) (bank shall not pay bonuses as of effective date of consent order).
89
 Bank of Wallowa County, FD1C-90-16b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 10,047,
C-239 (Feb. 14, 1990).
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The Insured Institution shall terminate its practice of paying
bonuses to management, including the chief executive officer,
based solely upon profits. The payment of bonuses shall be
carefully justified and based on a broad range of factors, includ-
ing asset quality, capital adequacy, liquidity, volume of earn-
ings from operations rather than nonrecurring sources, and
the Insured Institution's condition as assessed by the Insured
Institution's regulators and reflected in the institution's most
recent Report of Examination, and other appropriate factors.`"
Similar to the restrictions on bonus payments, the agencies have
restricted banks' ability to enter into severance agreements without the
prior consent of the agency.`' The agencies have also imposed restric-
tions on compensation paid to directors. For example, one order
banned entirely fees paid to inside directors," 2
 one order conditioned
payment of director fees on the agency's prior written consent," an-
other limited any increases of fees paid to directors and placed a
total dollar cap on the directors' annual compensation, 94 and another
YU Id. at C-244.
91
 Industrial Bank, FDIC-93-233b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,905, 0-
3516, G-3522 (Nov. 17, 1993) ("[T]he bank shall not enter into any severance agreements with
any senior executive officers of the Bank . without the prior written consent of the [FDIC]
Regional Director."); Bank of New England, OCC EA No. 77, 1990 OCC Enforcement Decisions
LEXIS 58, at *5 (May 11, 1990) ("Prior to entering into any new ... severance agreements, or
renewing or extending any such existing agreements with the Bank's senior officers ... the Bank
shall provide the Deputy Comptroller with thirty (30) days prior written notice and the Deputy
Comptroller shall have the authority to veto such agreements."); Connecticut Bank & Trust, OCC
EA No. 57, 1990 OCC Enforcement Decisions LEXIS 60, at *2 (Apr. 16, 1990) (same).
'j2
 Bank of Commerce, FDIC-93-118b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,808,
C-3229, G-3229-33 (May 27, 1993). The order provided that the bank would cease paying inside
director fees during the life of the cease and desist order, and provided further that the hank
would cease paying any "monthly community liaison fees to any director." M. at C-3233; see also
Chiretio State Bank, FDIC-90-32b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,059, C-297
(Mar. 30, 1990) ("[T]he Bank shall eliminate all fees paid to members of the loan committee
and funds management committee for services performed on such committees.").
9;t Cal. , FDIC-90-240b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,130, G-
622, C—Ei29 (Nov. 6, 1990) ("[T]he Bank shall not compensate any director for attending hoard
meetings or committee meetings without the prior written approval of the [FDIC] Regional
Director.").
94
 Arizona Commerce Bank, FDIC-90-100b, FDIC Enforcement. Decisions and Orders
10,077, C-384, 6-387 (May 30, 1990) (bank shall not pay directors for attending hoard or
committee meetings in amount greater than that reported in last report of examination, and
total compensation paid to any director shall not exceed $75,000 during 1990); see also Trust. Co.
of N.J., FDIG-94-129b (Oct. 12, 1994) ("[A]ny compensation received by directors for attending
board of director meetings and/or board committee meetings shall be explicitly set at a fixed
amount per director."), available in WESTLAW, FFIN-FDIC Database; Western Community Bank,
FDIC-91-90h, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,210, C-939, C.,-944 (Apr. 3, 1991)
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mandated termination of the bank's directors' deferred compensation
plan.95
The most specific types of corrective measures that appear in cease
and desist orders are those that address compensation paid to particu-
lar IAPs.'"' In such orders the bank may be directed to rescind all or
part of its employment contract with a specific IAP," 7 or even require
reimbursement for bonuses or payments previously made." Some or-
ders limit compensation paid to particular IAPs."9
ii. Orders Shaping Future Compensation Practices
The corrective measures discussed above involve directives for
some affirmative, concrete action (or forbearance from action) relat-
ing to the bank's existing compensation practices. Many cease and
desist orders, however, address compensation in ways that; appear in-
("Mite Bank shall not increase or provide additional compensation to directors without the
prior written consent of the [FDIC] Regional Director and the [state bank commissioned.").
95 Green Mountain Bank, FD10-92-48b (Feb. 14, 1902), available in WESTLAW, FFIN-FDIC
Database; see also Coronado Bank, FDIC-90-106b, FDIC Enforcement. Decisions and Orders
10,085, C-446, 0-449 (June 19, 1990) (bank ordered to amend its records to reflect the present
value of deferred ctimpensation benefits).
'The	 'nay or may mot be respondents in the enforcement action that gives rise to the
cease and desist order.
97 See, e.g., Corporate Bank, FDIC'-93-31h, FDIC Et& trcemen t Decisions and Orders ¶ 10,058,
C-3616, C-3621 (Mar. 15, 1094) ("The Bank shall rescind paragraph 6 of the Bank's Entploytneu t
Agreement with Richard C. Brown dated May 15, 1990 . . . ."); Golden Cam Bank, FDIC-93-50h,
FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders ¶ 10,737, 0-310l, 0-3107-08 (Mar. 5, 1993) ("The
Rank shall terminate and rescind the incentive-based compensation agreements which the Bank
has entered into with James R. Woolwine and Joseph Torrano."); Desert Sun Bank, FD1C-90-175h,
FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,109, C-522, C-528 (Aug. 31, 1990) ("The Bank
shall rescind the December 15, 1989 Consulting Agreement between the Bank and Gordon J.
Cranny.").
98 See, e.g., First. Nat'l Bank of Newell, OCC EA No, 573, 1991 OCC Enforcement Decisions
LEXIS 343, at *2 (June 25, 1991) (bank shall initiate ttctitm to cause Roberta E. Hill to reimburse
hank for bonuses, fees, or payments made to her from 1980 to 1991).
9 Texas Coastal Bank, No. 93-048-B-8M, slip op. at 8-0 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., May 16, 1995) (bank prohibited from paying "salary, bonus, management or service
fee of any nature" to two respondents without written consent of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas); Robert G. Cruse, Sr., FDIC-93-19 lb, FDIC EnfOrcement Decisions and Orders' 10,876,
0-3428, C-3430 (Sept. 17, 1093) ('"l'he Bank shall not pay any extraordinary compensation nor
establish any severance payments tbr the benefit of the Individual Respondents."); William R.
Bottorf, FDIC-92-120b (May 7, 1992) (except as provided, bank prohibited from paying Willi:1111
It. Bottorf in excess of $39,175 and Phillip M. Lewis in excess of $31,675), available in WESTLAW,
FFIN-FDIC Database; First Nat'l Bank of Cold Spring, OCC EA No. 493, 1992 OCC Enforcement
Decisions LEXIS 31 1, at *6-7 (Apr. 1, 1992) (board shall review compensation of Glenn Ileitzman
to ensure that twit! amount paid is consistent with type, level, quality and value of services
Eleitiman renders to bank); Coltimbian Nat'l Bank & 'frost Co., OCC EA No. 428, 1991 OCC
Enforcement Decisions 1..EX1S 515, at *2-3 (Nov, 25, 1991) (hoard shall review appropriateness
of all direct and indirect competisafitut to, or fur benefit of', Carl L. McCaflree, any of his related
interests, or any of his relations by blood or marriage).
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tended to affect the future course of a bank's compensation for its
employees. These orders direct the hank to undertake a review of its
current compensation system with a view toward improving such prac-
tices.'"" They mandate a review of compensation paid to all employees
or, more specifically, the compensation paid to executive management
or a particular IAP.
Orders directing a review of compensation typically contain a list
of several factors that the bank (or board of directors) should consider
in conducting their review. Among the factors to be considered in the
review are: the bank's financial condition;'"' the legitimate needs of the
bank;' 02
 the duties, responsibilities and performance of each position;"
'' See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 679, 1992 OCC Enforcement Decisions LEXIS 120,
at *17-18 (Aug, 6, 1992) (board shall develop and document program by which it determines
compensation levels for all executive officers of bank to be forwarded to Director of Philadelphia
Field Office fir review and approval).
lul See, eK Midcounty Bank & Trust Co., FDIC-90-232b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and
Orders 1 10,127 at 0-615 (Nov. 1, 1990) (compensation to be reviewed to determine its "appro-
priateness in view of the Bank's current and projected levels of earnings"); Norwood Co-op. Bank,
FDIC,-90-208b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,121 at C-580 (Oct. 12, 1990)
(same); see also Written Agreement by and among Execufirst Bancorp, Inc., First Executive Bank
and Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, No. 95-010-WA/RB-HG, slip op. at 5 (Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., May 24, 1995) (compensation to be "justified based on the Bank's
financial condition, including, but not limited to, the Bank's earnings, asset quality, liquidity; and
capital needs").
1112 Sfe, e.g., Columbian Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., OCC EA No. 428, 1991 OCC Enforcement
Decisions LEXIS 515, at *3 (Nov. 25, 1991) (written insider compensation plan "shall require
that each payment he made only for legitimate bank business needs"); Security Bank, OCC EA
No. 340, 1991 OCC Enforcement Decisions LEXIS 129, at *9 (Aug. 12, 1991) (same); First Nat'l
Bank, OCC EA No. 573, 1991 OCC Enforcement Decisions LEXIS 343, at *3 (June 25, 1991)
(same); see also Written Agreement by and among Execufirst Bancorp, Inc., First Executive Bank
and Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, No. 95-010-WA/RR-FIG, slip op. at 5 (Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., May 24, 1995) (compensation to be "related to the services actually
rendered to or on behalf of the Bank").
1" See, e.g., First Los Angeles Bank, FDIC-94-130b (Oct. 3, 1994) (compensation review to
include "a critical analysis of each individual's background, experience, duties and responsibili-
ties, and an appraisal of each individual's performance compared to the present level of com-
pensation"), available in WESTLAW, FFIN-FDIC Database; Wilshire State Bank, FDIG93-101b,
FDIC EnlOrcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,799, C-3208, C-3214 (May 14, 1993) (same); First
Fidelity Thrift & Loan, FDIC,-93-41b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,731, C-3062,
C-3069 (Feb. 26, 1993) (same); First State Bank, FDIC-92-243b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions
and Orders 1 10,608, C-2600, C-2606 (July 30, 1992) (compensation report to include "a
statement of the duties and responsibilities of, and the actual services performed for the Bank
by, each director, officer and employee"); Citizens W. Bank, FDIC-91-35b, FDIC Enforcement
Decisions and Orders 1 10,238, C-1017, G1021 (May 14, 1991) (compensation review to include
"a critical analysis of each individual's duties and responsibilities, and an appraisal of each
individual's performance compared to the present level of compensation"); see also Written
Agreement by and among Execufirst Bancorp, Inc., First Executive Bank and Fed. Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia, No. 95-010-WA/RB-HC, slip op. at 5 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
May 24, 1995) (compensation to he "paid in accordance with the duties, responsibilities and
obligations of the Bank's executive officers and directors"); Charter Pacific Bank, FDIC-92-253h,
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and the compensation paid by financial institutions of comparable size,
condition and geographic location.'"
Some orders contain requirements aimed at obtaining an objec-
tive, unbiased review of the hank's compensation practices. For exam-
ple, some orders call for the assistance of an outside consultant in the
development of a compensation plan.'''' A few orders mandate that the
review be conducted by an independent board committec. 1 "6
FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,895, C-3485, C-3490 (Nov. 2, 1993) (written
executive compensation agreement to "incorporate qualitative as well as profitability perlOrmance
standards"); Brentwood Thrift & Loan Ass'n, FDIG93-220b, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and
Orders 1 10,878, C-3432, C-3445 (Sept. 21, 1993) (same); Seoul Bank of Cal., FDIC-93-57b,
FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,762, C.-3145, C-3151 (Mar. 19, 1993) (same).
1 °4 See, e.g., First Los Angeles Bank, FDIC-94-130b (Oct. 3, 1994) (compensation review to
include "a comparison of each officer's total compensation with compensation received by
officers with similar responsibilities in similar institutions"), available in WESTLAW, FF1N-FDIC
Database; Wilshire State Bank, FDIC-93-10]h, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,799,
C-3208, C-3214 (May 14, 1993) (same); First Fidelity Thrift & Loan, FD1C-93-41b, FDIC Enforce-
ment Decisions and Orders 1 10,731, at C-3069 (Feb. 26, 1993) (same); First State Bank,
FDIG-92-243h, FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 1 10,608, G-2600, C-2606 (July 30,
1992) (compensation report to take into consideration "any industry standards fbr banks of
comparable size offering sim liar services"); First Cal. Bank, FDIC-91-204h (July 18, 1991) (com-
pensation review to include "a comparison of each officer's total compensation with compensa-
tion received by officers with similar responsibilities in similar institutions"), available in WEST-
LAW, FFIN-FDIC Database; American State Bank, FDIC-90-43h (Mar. 23, 1990) (compensation
in new budget plan "should he comparable to lees paid in tither financial institutions of similar
size and characteristics"), available in WESTLAW, FF1N-FDIC Database; see also Written Agree-
ment by and among Execulirst Bancorp, Inc., First Executive Bank and Fed. Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, No. 95-010-WA/WA-IC, slip op. at 5 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
May 24, 1995) (compensation to be ctinsistent with salaries and bitnitses paid by financial
institutions of comparable size, condition and geographic location).
116 See, e.g., Bank of Walnut, FDIC-91-369b, FDIC Enforcement. Decisions and Orders
1 10,647, C-2729, C-2736 (Sept. 29, 1992) (hank ordered to hire independent external auditor,
acceptable to FDIC, to determine reasonableness of compensation paid to three IAPs and their
related interests); Gladstone-Norwood Trust & Say. Bank, FDIC-92-279b (Sept. 9, 1992) (bank
ordered to hire bank consultant. acceptable to FDIC to "develop a written analysis and assessment
of the Bank's senior executive officers, management and staffing needs of Bank's loan depart-
ment"), available in WESTLAW, Database; Marathon Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 670,
1992 OCC Enforcement Decisions LEXIS 111, at *2 (Aug. 10, 1992) (consultant to assess reason-
ableness of method used to determine management and board compensation, including bo-
nuses); Vinings Bank & Trust, Nat'l Ass'n, OCC EA No. 435, 1992 OCC Enforcement Decisions
LEXIS 19, at *3-4 (Jan. 8, 1992) (consultant shall evaluate perlOrmance of each officer of bank
with conclusion reached as to the adequacy of performance and appropriateness of each officer's
compensation); Continental Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 440, 1992 OCC Enfbrcement Decisions
LEXIS 16, at *2-4 (Jan. 22, 1992) (bank ordered to employ "an independent outside management
consultant," subject to OCC_ __'s approval, to evaluate bank's compensation and bonus plans); Metro
Bank, N.A., OCC EA No. 198, 1991 OCC Enforcement Decisions LEXIS 15, at *5 (Apr. 1, 1991)
(formal agreement) (bank ordered to complete study of compensation and benefits paid to
executive management and may use outside management consultant to complete study); Paul C.
Hufnagle, FDIC-90-104b (Jan. 4, 1991) (bank ordered to hire "au individual or firm that is
independent with respect to the Bank and that possesses recognized expertise in banking" to
perform an audit of payments made to 1APs), available in WESTLAW, !TIN-FDIC Database,
1 °6 See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank, OCC FA No. 438, 1992 OCC Enforcement Decisions LEXIS 17,
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B. Agency Regulations
In addition to their broad authority to bring formal enforcement
actions for unsafe or unsound banking practices, the agencies have
promulgated various regulationsw specifically limiting compensation
practices.'" The regulations discussed in this section are those that are
applicable to banks regardless of their financial condition.'"" Regula-
tions that target financially troubled banks are discussed in part II.
1. Employment Contracts
In 1982, the OTS adopted regulations limiting savings associa-
tions' ability to enter into employment contracts.'° Section 563.39
provides that a savings association may enter into an employment
contract with its officers or other employees but that any such contract
must he in accordance with the section's provisions."' The purpose of
this regulation was to "terminate contracts negotiated by the failed
institution in the past, which `bestow(ed) huge benefits on the very
managers who were responsible for the bank's demise. "112 As will be
clear from the discussion below, however, the regulation goes far be-
yond its stated purpose. The regulation's provisions operate to tenni-
at * 1-3 (Jan. 21, 1992) (bank ordered to appoint compli;ince committee to review and report on
appropriateness of director and management compensation and other issues); Continental Nat'l
Bank, OCC EA No. 440, 1992 OCC EnfOrcement Decisions LEXIS 16, at *2-4 (Ian. 22, 1992)
(bank ordered to appoint contpliance committee to address compensation and other issues,
comprised of at least. five directors who were not bank officers, subject to OCC veto); 'Worthington
State Bank, FDIG91-19 lb (July 9, 1991) (bank ordered to establish a salary review committee
comprised of independent directors), available in WESTLAW, FEIN-FDIC Database.
107 The discussion herein focuses on agency regulations with the most comprehensive impact
upon compensation. For more specific limitations, see 60 Fed. Reg. 47498 (1995) (proposed Sept.
13, 1995) (ACC's proposed rule regarding limitations on compensation for credit life insurance
sales).
108 The Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated regulations covering disclo-
sure of compensation paid to certain corporate executives. See .supra note 14. This article focuses
on regulations that are peculiar to banks. The SEC's disclosure regulations are beyond the scope
of this article since they are applicable to both hank and nonbank corporations. The FDIC
promulgated disclosure rules substantially similar to the SEC requirements. 12 C.F.R. § 335 (1996).
mAs a practical matter, however, the regulations most often become an issue in administra-
tive actions or in litigation when the bank is troubled or failed.
1111 12 C.F.R. § 563.39, This is an OTS regulation only. Therefore, it has no application to
commercial banks.
I II Id. § 563.39 (a) .
112 Rice v. Resolution Trust Corp., 785 E Stipp. 1385, 1388 (D. Ariz. 1992) (citing Federal
Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Quinn, 922 F.2d 1251, 1257 (6th Cir. 1991)). See also Texas Commerce
Bank, N.A. v. United Say. Ass'n, 789 F. Stipp. 848, 851-52 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (citing 47 Fed. Reg.
17471 (1982)) (The underlying purpose "wash) provide the [Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, the OTS's predecessor] with greater flexibility to reject excessive terms and excessive
benefit contracts for employment").
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nate employment agreements under certain circumstances, without
any finding of lack of care or negligence on the part of the employees
receiving benefits under such contracts.
Section 563.39 provides that the employment contract must be in
writing," 3 and may not constitute an unsafe or unsound banking prac-
tice."4 The regulation provides that the contract must contain the
following five provisions relating to termination.''' First, the savings
association may terminate an employee's employment at any time.""
This provision does not affect the employee's rights to compensation
under the contract."? Second, if the employee is suspended or tempo-
rarily removed from office," 8 then the savings association's obligations
under the contract are suspended."" Third, the savings association's
obligations under the contract terminate in the event the employee is
permanently removed from office.'" Vested rights under the contract,
however, are not affected by this provision.I 2 ' Fourth, unless the Direc-
tor of the OTS grants prior written approval, the obligations under the
contract terminate in the event the savings association is placed in a
receivership or conservatorship.' 22 Again, vested rights are not affected
115 12 C.F.R. A 563.39(a).
114 Id. With regard to what. would constitute an unsafe or unsound banking practice in this
context, the regulation explains:
The making of such an employment contract would he an unsafe or unsound
practice if such contract could lead to material financial loss or damage to the
association or could interfere materially with the exercise by the members of its
board of' directors of their duty or discretion provided by law, charter, bylaw or
regulation as to the employment or termination of employment of an ()Ricer or
employee of the association. This . may occur, depending up on the circumstances
of the case, where an employment contract provides fOr an excessive term.
Id.
115 Id.	 563.39(b). Even if these provisions are ma inchalet1 in the actual employment
contract, they will be considered implied terms of the agreement, Barnes v. Resolution Trust.
Corp., No. 91-2011—V, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1841, at *8 (D. Kan. 1992).
115 1`2 C.F.R. § 563.39(b) (1 ).
117 Id. The employee, however, will not have rights to compensation or benefits "for any
period after termination !Or cause." Id. This provision further provides that termination lOr cause
shall include terinination because of the officer or employee's personal dishonesty,
incompetence, willful misconduct, breach of fiduciary duly involving personal
profit, intentional lailtire to perform stated duties, willful violation of any law, rule,
or regulation (other than traffic violations or similar offenses) or final cease-and-
desist order, or material breach of any provision of the contract.
Id.
L"' See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text (discussing the agencies' authority to
remove LAPs from office),
119 12 C.F.R. § 563.39(h) (2).
lit Ir1. § 563.39(b) (3),
121 Id. For a discussion of courts' interpretation of "vested rights" under this regulation, see
supra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
122 12 GER
. § 563.39(1,)(4); 12 U.S.C. § 1813(x) (1996),
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by this provision.'" Fifth, the OTS Director may terminate all obliga-
tions under the contract if the FDIC or RTC agrees to provide assistance
to the savings association, if a supervisory merger of the association is
approved, or if the Director determines that the savings association is in
an unsafe or unsound condition.' 24 None of the five termination provi-
sions requires any finding of wrongdoing on the part of the employee.
The litigation involving Section 563.39 has focused upon issues of
interpretation. As discussed below, courts have considered the mean-
ing of the terms "employment contract" and "vested rights" in the
context of this regulation.
a. Interpretation of "Employment Contract"
Courts have examined at length the meaning of the term "employ-
ment. contract." 12r' This is an important issue in any case involving
Section 563.39 since the regulation only limits a savings association's
ability to enter into employment contracts, and not every contract
between an employee and a savings association is an employment
contract subject to the restrictions of this regulation. Courts have
resorted to a dictionary definition which defines an employment con-
tract as "an agreement or contract between employer and employee in
which the terms and conditions of one's employment are provided. "126
Relying upon this definition, 127
 courts have tooked to whether the
contract in question contains terms and conditions of employment,
such as a covenant not to compete' 28
 or an agreement to maintain no
other employment.' 2" If the contract does not contain terms of employ-
ment, it is not an employment contract governed by the regulation.'"
b. Interpretation of "Vested Rights"
The second major issue of interpretation of Section 563.39 in-
volves the meaning of the term "vested rights." While the regulation
123 12 C.F.R. 563.39(6)(4); 12 U.S.C. § 1813(x).
1" 12 C.F.R. 563.39(h)(5).
125 Section 563.39 provides no definition for 'employment contract."
126
 Rice v. Resolution Trust Corp., 785 F. Supp. 1385, 1388 (D. Ariz. 1992) (quoting litaactt's
Low DicrioNARY 363 (6th ed. 1990)).
127 The following decisions have relied on the BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY definition:
Modzelewski v. Resolution Trust Corp., 14 F.3d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir, 1994); Majeski v. Resolution
Trust Corp., No. Civ. A. 94-738, 1995 WL 115953, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1995); Marsa v. Metrohank
for Say., F.S,B., 825 F. Stipp. 658, 663 (D.N.J. 1993); Rice, 785 F. Supp. at 1390.
128 Morlialpwski, 14 F.3d at 1376; Rice, 785 F. Stipp. at 1389.
126
 Modzelertoski, 14 F.3d at 1376; Rice, 785 F. Supp. at 1389.
13"Majcski,No. Civ. A. 94-738 ,I 995 WL 115953,'at *3; Marsa, 825 F. Stipp. at 663; Fresca v.
FDIC, 818 F. Stipp, 664, 667 (S.D.N.V. 1993).
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requires employment contracts to include provisions allowing for the
termination of a savings association's obligations under the contract
under certain circumstances, two of the termination provisions carry
the caveat that vested rights are not affected by such termination. One
of the provisions that preserves vested rights allows for the termination
of the savings association's obligations in the event the employee is
permanently removed from office."' The other provision that pre-
serves vested rights allows for the termination of the savings associa-
tion's obligations under the contract if the savings association receives
assistance from the FDIC or RTC or is found to be in an unsafe or
unsound condition.'" As illustrated below, the latter provision has
become very important in cases in which the FDIC or RTC have been
appointed as receiver for a failed institution.'" In such cases, the FDIC
and RTC have used the provision to avoid payments under employ-
ment contracts, arguing that the obligations under the contracts ter-
minate upon their appointment as receiver. The issue of vesting in
many such cases is dispositive.
The term "vested rights" is not defined in Section 563.39. In
supplying a workable definition, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit concluded:
[I] n order to be vested as that term is used in [Section
563.39], rights need not be free of every contingency or
possibility of divestiture. Rather, a right is vested when the
employee holding the right is entitled to claim immediate
payment. It's not material that the employee fails to make
such a demand—exposing himself to the risk of divestiture—
so long as the decision not to claim payment lies entirely
within his control."'
The Ninth Circuit applied this definition in a case involving the
RTC's refusal to pay two executives of MeraBank under a "salary
continuation agreement.""' The agreement provided the executives,
Ernest Modzelewski and Gene Rice, with 120 monthly payments in the
event of retirement, death or termination. The purpose of the agree-
ment was "presumably to secure the most talented managers."'"
131 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
132 See supra note 124 and accompanying Lela.
133
 Obviously, there were a great many of such cases in the wake of the savings and loan crisis.
134
 Modzelewski, 14 F.3d at 1378.
13r'
135 Id. at 1375. The RTC proved no wrongdoing by the executives. The court chastised the
RTC on this score: "RTC also insinuates throughout its briefs that Rice and Modzelewski led
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MeraBank failed in January of 1990, and the RTC took over as
receiver. The RTC refused to pay Modzelewski and Rice under the
salary continuation agreement claiming, among other things, that the
agreement terminated under Section 563.39(b) (5) upon appointment
of the RTC as receiver's 7 and that the employees' rights had not vested
at the time of termination. The court concluded that, because Rice
reached retirement age prior to the RTC's appointment as receiver, his
rights under the agreement had vested.° The court, however, con-
cluded that Modzelewski's rights had not vested under the agree-
ment.'39 The court reasoned that because Modzelewski had not reached
retirement age at the time of termination of the agreement and,
therefore, had not yet, as of the time of termination, earned the right
to claim benefits under the agreement, his rights had not vested.""
District courts have applied a similar line of reasoning in address-
ing the question of whether rights under an employment contract have
vested."' If all conditions under the employment agreement are met
prior to termination of the agreement under the provisions of Section
563.39 (most frequently upon the appointment of the FDIC or RTC as
receiver), then the employee's rights will be deemed vested."2 On the
other hand, if a condition under the employment agreement is not
met at the time of termination under Section 563.39, rights under the
agreement are not vested and are therefore forfeited. For example,
rights under a severance agreement that provides employees with benefits
in the event the employee is terminated without cause would be for-
MentBank to its ruin and should therefore he denied their benefits. Obviously, many circum-
stances contributed to the S & L crisis, and we consider it inappropriate for counsel to cast
aspersions without any support in the record." Id. at 1376 n.l.
157 Section 563.39(h) (5) provides, in pertinent part, for termination of the obligations under
the employment contract in the event the savings association receives assistance from the RTC.
See supra note 124 arid accompanying text.
i:"41 Modzelewski, 14 F.3(1 at 1378.
1.1" a at 1378. The Ninth Circuit adopted the same reasoning in a subsequent, similar case
in which the plaintiff had not reached retirement age prior to the termination of an alleged
agreement. to pay retirement benefits beginning at age 65. SeeAronson v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
38 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1994). The court held that the plaintiffs rights had not vested. Id.
Although many of these cases apply similar reasoning, they do not necessarily follow the
Ninth Circuit's Affridzeiewthi decision since many of the district court cases pre-date that decision.
14'2 See, e.br, Fresea, 818 F. Supp. at 666 (plaintiffs rights to benefits under early retirement
package vested when she retired almost one year prior to appointment of FDIC as receiver);
Matsu, 825 F. Supp. at 664 (plaintiffs rights under settlement agreement vested when he executed
the agreement and resigned his position which occurred over a year prior to appointment of
RTC as receiver): Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. v. United Say. Ass'n, 789 F. Supp. 848, 852 (S.D.
Tex. 1992) (employees' rights under compensation plan vested when employees continued to
work through date designated in plan which was same date of appointment of FSLIC as receiver).
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feited if that condition was not met at the time the bank was placed in
receivership."'
2. Safety and Soundness Standards
As discussed above, the concept. of "safety and soundness" under-
lies the most comprehensive powers enjoyed by the federal banking
agencies. Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA") with the goal of providing the
banking agencies with new powers designed to prevent problems in
banks' operations or, at a minimum, to resolve problems at the least
cost to the deposit insurance fund."' Included in these new powers is
a new Section 39 of the FDIA directing each federal banking agency
to prescribe standards for safety and soundness'"`' in several important
areas of bank operations, including compensation practices."' These
safety and soundness standards are applicable to a bank regardless of
the bank's financial condition.
Section 39 of the FDIA includes two provisions affecting banks'
compensation practices. First, Section 39(a) directs the agencies to
prescribe, by guideline or regulation, standards relating to "compen-
sation, fees, and benefits."" 7 Second, Section 39(c) directs the agencies
to prohibit, by guideline or regulation, practices that would provide
"excessive compensation, fees, or benefits" or that could "lead to ma-
terial financial loss" to the bank."' Moreover, Congress directed that
1-1 :1 See, e.g., Romines v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 865 F. Stipp. 007, 010 (E.D. Mo. 1994)
(plaintiff's rights to payments were cimclitioned on termination without cause; this condition did
not occur prior to termination of employment agreement under provisions of § 503.39); Rice v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 785 F. Stipp. 1385, 1392 (I). Ariz. 1992) (same); Barnes v. Resolution
Trust Corp., No. 91-2011N, 1992 U,S, Dist, LEXIS 1841, at 7 (I). Kan. 1992) (same).
I'm 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(a) (1996).
145 Id. § 1831p—I. Since the enactment of FD1CIA, § 39 of the FDIA has been amended twice.
First by § 956 of the Housing :ind Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550,
and second by § 318 of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, EDICIA also granted the agencies the authority to take various
forms of action once an institution Ihils to meet defined capital standards. Sep infra part. II.A
(discussing prompt corrective action provisions lir FD1CIA relating to bumbled institutions).
I" 12 U.S.C. § 1831p—I (a) (1) (F). The other operational and management. standards re-
quired by § 39 include standards relating to batiks' internal conmils, loan thwumentatio• credit
underwriting, interest rate exposure and asset growl h. ld. § 1831p-1 (a) (l) (A)—(E). Section 39
also requires the agencies to prescribe standards relating to asset quality, earnings and stock
valuation. Id. § 1831p- 1(b),
07 14. § 1831p-1(a) (I) (F). These standards must be "in accordance with [Section 39(c)]."
Id. Section 39(c) is discussed infra note 148.
12 U.S.C. § 18311)-1(c). Section 39(c) of the FDIA provides:
Compensation standards. Each appropriate Federal banking agency shall, for all
insured depository institutions, prescribe-
890	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 37:861
any guideline or regulation promulgated under Section 39 "may not
prescribe standards that set a specific level or range of compensation for
directors, officers or employees of insured depository institutions."149
If a bank fails to meet the standards prescribed under Section
39(a), the bank must submit a plan, acceptable to the agency, specify-
ing the steps the institution will take to correct the deficiency.' 5° If the
institution fails to submit an acceptable plan, or fails to implement a
plan accepted by the agency, the agency has broad authority to man-
date remedial measures. Under such circumstances, Congress granted
the agencies the authority to take any of the following supervisory
actions until the deficiency is corrected: (i) prohibit growth of the
bank's average total assets; 15 ' (ii) require the bank to increase its ratio
(I) standards prohibiting as an unsafe and unsound practice any employment
contract, compensation or benefit agreement, fee arrangement, perquisite, stock
option plan, postemployment benefit, or other compensatory arrangement that—
(A) would provide any executive officer, employee, director, or principal share-
holder of the institution with excessive compensation, fees or benefits; or
(13) could lead to material financial loss to the institution;
(2) standards specifying when compensation, fees, or benefits referred to in para-
graph (1) are excessive, which shall require the agency to determine whether the
amounts are unreasonable or disproportionate to the services actually performed
by the individual by considering—
(A) the combined value of all cash and noncash benefits provided to the individ-
ual;
(13) the compensation history of the individual and other individuals with com-
parable expertise at the institution;
(C) the financial condition of the institution;
(D) comparable compensation practices at comparable institutions, based upon
such factors as asset size, geographic location, and the complexity of the loan
portfolio or other assets;
(E) for postemployment benefits, the projected total cost and benefit to the
institution;
(F) any connection between the individual and any fraudulent act or omission,
breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or insider abuse with regard to the institution; and
(G) other factors that the agency determines to be relevant; and
(3) such other standards relating to compensation, fees, and benefits as the agency
determines to be appropriate.
Id.
/19 Id. § 18311)-1(d) (1). This provision, however, does not affect the agencies' authority to
restrict the level of compensation paid to bank personnel under any other provision of law. Id.
§ 1831p-1(d)(2).
ITA ) /d.	 1831p-1(e)(1),
1 m Specifically, the ARIA may:
[p] rohibit the [bank) from permitting its average total assets during any calendar
quarter to exceed its average total assets during the preceding calendar quarter, or
restrict the rate at which the average total assets of the [bank] may increase from
one calendar quarter to another.
Id. § 1831p-1(42)(2)(13)W.
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of tangible equity to assets; 152 (iii) restrict the interest rates the bank
pays on deposits;'" and (iv) require the institution to take any other
action that will serve the purpose of resolving the bank's problems with
the least possible long-term loss to the deposit insurance fund. 154
Section 39 provides no specific consequences in the event a bank
engages in practices proscribed by Section 39(c). Presumably, such
practices would constitute unsafe or unsound banking practices allow-
ing the agencies to utilize their formal enforcement powers.' 55 In ad-
dition, the agencies retain the authority to initiate enforcement pro-
ceedings without the necessity of proving a violation of.the Section 39
guidelines or regulations. Section 39 does not restrict the agencies'
ability to bring such actions.' 56
In July of 1992, the federal banking agencies published a Joint
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("ANPR") requesting com-
ments on the issues raised by Section 39.' 57 The agencies received over
400 comments and published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPR")
in November of 1993.' 58 The NPR reported that commenters strongly
preferred general, rather than specific, standards "to avoid regulatory
micromanagement of the banking and thrift industries." 1"
Two-and-a-half years later, in July of 1995, the agencies issued a
final rule promulgating Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards
for Safety and Soundness ("Guidelines").'` 0 In creating standards relat-
ing to compensation,hil the Guidelines embrace the preference of
commentators for general, as opposed to specific, standards. The Guide-
152 Id. § 1831p-1(e)(2)(B)(ii).
151 Section 1851p-1(e) (2) (B) (iii) allows the MBA to take any action described in Section
1831o(1)(2)(G). The latter allows the AFBA to "[r]estrict1 the interest. rates that the [bank] pays
on deposits to the prevailing rates of interest on deposits of comparable amounts and maturities
in the region where the institution is located, as determined by the agency." 12 U.S.C.
§ 183110 ( 1 ) (2) (C) ( 1 ).
154 See id, § 1831p- 1(0(2)(B) (iv); id. §1831o(a)(1).
155 See supra part 1.A (discussing the agencies' formal enforcement powers).
156 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1(d) (4) (B); id. § 1831p-1(g).
157 57 Fed. Reg. 31336 (1992).
158 58 Fed. Reg, 60802 (1993). For an analysis of the NI'R, see generally Baxter, supra note 25.
159 58 Fed. Reg. 60802, 60803 (1993). The majority of' the comments came from banks. Id.
159 60 Fed. Reg. 35674 (1995). Section 39 permits the agencies to adopt standards for safety
and soundness by either regulation or guideline. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
181 The Guidelines define "compensation" as follows:
[API direct and indirect payments or benefits, both cash and non-cash, granted to
or l'or the benefit of any executive officer, employee, director, or principal share-
holder, including but not limited to payments or benefits derived from an employ-
ment. contract, compensation or benefit agreement, fee arranginent, perquisite,
stock option plan, postemployment benefit, or other compensatory arrangement.
50 Fed. Reg. at 35679.
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lines issued under Section 39(a) require only that "[a] n institution
should maintain safeguards to prevent the payment of compensation,
fees and benefits that are excessive or that could lead to material
financial loss to the institution." 162
 In providing standards for what
would constitute "excessive" compensation prohibited under Section
39(c), 165
 the Guidelines rely solely on the language of the statute.' 6'
The last of the seven factors provided in Section 39(c) is "other factors
that the agency determines to be relevant."' 15 Since the Guidelines
adopt the statutory factors almost verbatim, the agencies have provided
no guidance on what other "factors" might be relevant in determining
what constitutes "excessive" compensation. Finally, in providing stand-
ards for what would constitute compensation that "could lead to ma-
terial financial loss to the institution," also prohibited under Section
39(c),' 66 the Guidelines state only that "[c]ompensation that could lead
to material financial loss to an institution is prohibited as an unsafe
and unsound practice."'"
II. TROUBLED INSTITUTIONS
The bank agencies' interest in a bank's clay to day business affairs
is heightened when that bank begins to experience financial trouble.
The experience of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s led Congress
to the conclusion that the agencies must be given the tools and the
mandate to fix what is broken in an institution before it is beyond
repair. In 1991, Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration Improvement Act ("FDICIA"),m which includes provisions
for "prompt corrective action" mandating the agencies to assume a
more proactive role with regard to the supervision of troubled institu-
tions. 169 This part of the article will discuss FDICIA's prompt corrective
action provision, including its limitations on banks' compensation
practices.
Congress also sought to prevent the management abuses that are
believed to be part of the cause of the savings and loan crisis.' 70 Stories
162 Id, at 35680.
163
 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
164 60 Fed. Reg. at 35680. See supra text accompanying note 114 (proposing language of the
statute).
1 °12	 § 1831p-1(c) (2)(G),
166 Id. § 1831p-1(c) (1) (13).
167 60 Fed. Reg. at 35680.
168
 Pub. L. No. 12-242,105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
169 See generally Lawrence C. Baxter, Administrative and Judicial Review of Prompt Corrective
Action Decisions try the Federal Banking Regulators, 7 Anrdix. Li. 505 (1993).
I7U See id.
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of executives who raided bank coffers when the bank was on the brink
of failure were likely the source of Congress's resolve to pass legislation
prohibiting certain "golden parachute payments." This legislation is
also analyzed in this part.
A. Prompt Corrective Action: Limitations on Executive Compensation for
Undercapitalized Institutions
In enacting FDICIA, Congress created a scheme of "prompt cor-
rective action," the purpose of which was "to resolve the problems of
insured depository institutions at the least possible long-term loss to
the deposit insurance fund." 171 The prompt corrective action provi-
sions operate on what has been described as a "tripwire" system,' 72
which allows the agencies to take various forms of action once a bank
fails to meet certain capital requirements. The prompt corrective ac-
tion provisions delineate five capital categories: 173 well capitalized,"'
adequately capitalized, 175 undercapitalized,"'' significantly undercapi-
talized"' or critically undercapitalized."' A bank's failure to meet the
requirements of a well capitalized or adequately capitalized institution
has various, and at times draconian, supervisory ramifications. For
example, an undercapitalized institution must submit an acceptable
capital restoration plan to the AFBA, and the AFBA is required to
closely monitor the institution and its compliance with any capital
171 12 U.S.0 § 1831o(a) (1). The prompt corrective action scheme is based on the premise
that iltu longer an insolvent bank is allowed to remain open, the more costly it will be to ultimately
resolve the bank once it fails. H.R. REP. No. 102-330, at 103-104 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901, 1916-17. See generally Baxter, supra note 169, at 505.
Baxter, supra note 169, at 516-28.
177 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b) (MAHE),
171 "Well capitalized' is defined in the regulations of each AFBA. See 12 C.F.R. § 325.103(h) ( 1)
(FDIC regulations); id. § 208.33(b) (1) (Fed regulations); id, § 6,4(1)(1) (OCC regulations); id.
§ 565.4 (h) (1) (OTS regulations).
175
 "Admivately capitalized" is defined in the regulations of each AFBA. See id.
§ 325.103(h) (2) (FDIC regulations); id. § 208.33(b) (2) (Fed regulations); id. § 6.4(b) (2) (OCC
regulations); id. § 565.4(b) (2) (OTS regulations).
171 i"Undercapitalized" is defined in the regulations of each AFBA. See id. § 325.1113(1)(3)
(FDIC regulations); id. § 208.3304 (3) (Fed. regulations); id. § 6,4 (b) (3) (OCC regulations); id.
§ 565.4(b) (3) (OTS regulations).
1 77 
"Significantly undercapitalized" is defined in the regulations of each MBA, See id.
§ 325.103(h) (4) (FDIC regulations); id. § 208.33(6)(4) (Fed. regulations); in'. § 6.4(b)(4) (OCC
regulations); id. § 565.4(h) (4) (OTS regulations).
178
 "Critically undercapitalized" is defined in the regulations of each MBA. See id.
§ 325.1030)(5) (FDIC regulations); id. § 208.33(b) (5) (Fed. regulations); id. § 0.4(b) (5) (OCC
regulations); id. § 565.4(1)(5) (OTS regulations). For a discussion of the application of this
standard, see Life Banerhare,v, Inc., to Fiechter, 847 F. Stipp. 434, 438-39 (M.D. La. 1993) (officer,
director and shareholder challenge to OTS's appointment of receiver).
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restoration plan.t79
 No later than ninety days after an institution be-
comes critically undercapitalized, the AFBA must appoint a receiver
for the institution or document the reasons that an alternative course
of action would involve the least long-term loss to the deposit insurance
fund. 18"
The prompt corrective actions provisions also impact a bank's
executive compensation. Banks that are significantly undercapitalized
or that are undercapitalized and have failed to submit or implement
an acceptable capital restoration plan may not, without prior written
approval of the AFBA, pay any bonus to any senior executive officer or
provide compensation to any senior executive office that exceeds the
officer's average compensation during the twelve months preceding
the month during which the bank became undercapitalized. 18 '
B. Golden Parachute Payments
The Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Tax-
payer Recovery Act of 1990 ("Fraud Act") 182 amended the FDIA to
provide the FDIC with the ability to prohibit or limit certain payments
payable to IAPs upon terminating their affiliation with their respective
banks. Specifically, Section 1828(k) (1) provides that the FDIC "may
prohibit or limit, by regulation or order, any golden parachute pay-
ment . . . "I"
The statutory definition of "golden parachute payment" has three
components. First, there must be a "payment" which includes "any
payment (or any agreement to make any payment) in the nature of
compensation by any [bank or bank holding company] for the benefit
of any [IAP] . . . ."' 84 Second, the obligation of the bank or bank
holding company to make the payment to the lAP must be contingent
on the termination of the lAP's affiliation with the bank or bank
holding company.' 85 Finally, the payment must be received on or after
a date on which one of the following events has occurred: (i) the bank,
the bank holding company or any bank subsidiary of the bank holding
179
 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e).
' 50 1d. § 1831o(h) (3).
181 Id. § 1831o(I) (4) (A). The AFBA is prohibited from granting such approval for an officer
of any institution that has failed to submit an acceptable capital restoration plan. Id.
§ 1831o(f) (4)(B).
I " PU1). L. No. 101-647, § 2523 (1990).
t "3 12 U.S.C. § 1828(k) (1996). Section 1828(k) also permits the FDIC to prohibit or limit
any indemnification payment. Id. The issue of indemnification is beyond the scope of this article.
184 I4. § 1828 (k) (4) (A).
155 Id. § 1828(k) (4)(A) (i).
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company becomes insolvent; (ii) a conservator or receiver is appointed
for the bank or the bank holding company; (iii) the AFBA determines
that the bank is in a troubled condition; (iv) the bank has received a
rating of four or five under the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating
System; or (v) the FDIC has initiated a proceeding against the bank to
terminate or suspend its deposit insurance. 186
 Under the statute, the
term "golden parachute payments" do not include the following: pay-
ments under certain retirement plans, 187
 payments made pursuant to
a bona fide deferred compensation plan that the FDIC determines to
be permissible'" and payments made by reason of death or disability.'"
On October 7, 1991, the FDIC published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking ("First NPR")'"" proposing regulations implementing its
authority under Section 1828(k), to limit golden parachute payments."
The FDIC received 186 comment letters in response to the First NPR
and took no further action on the First NPR.'"2 On March 29, 1995,
the FDIC again issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("Second
NPR") 193
 regarding golden parachute payments,'" which responded to
many of the comments to the First NPR. Following the Second NPR,
the FDIC issued its final rule on February 15, 1996. 1 " The following
section discusses selected major provisions set forth in the final rule,
including a discussion of how the final rule evolved from the First NPR
and Second NPR.
1. Bona Fide Deferred Compensation Plans
Congress provided the FDIC with the authority to exempt bona
fide deferred compensation plans from the proscriptions on golden
parachute payments.' 96
 Many commenters objected to the First NPR's
I 96 /d. § 1828(k) (4)(A)(ii).
197 A retirement plan is included in this exception if it is "qualified (or is intended to he
qualified) under section 401 of Title 2(1 or other nondiscriminatory benefit plan." Id.
§ 1828(k) (4) (C) (i).
199 The FDIC's determination may be made by regulation or order, 12 U.S.C.
I828(k)(4)(C)(ii).
199 1d. § 1828(k) (4) (C)(iii).
19°56 Fed. Reg. 50,529 (1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 359).
191
 The First NPR also proposes regulations limiting indemnification payments. Id.
192 60 Fed. Reg. 16,069 (1995) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 359).
195 1d. The Second NPR indicates that the FDIC decided to issue a second set of proposed
rules rather than final rules 'Wine to the significant amount of time which has passed since the
publication of" the First NPR. Id.
' 94 The Second NPR also contained proposed rules regarding indemnification payments.
195 61 Fed. Reg. 5,927 (1996).
199 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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requirement that a bona fide deferred compensation plan be funded
in order to fall outside of the definition of golden parachute pay-
ments.' 97
 These commenters noted the Internal Revenue Code's rec-
ognition of unfunded plans and the large number of existing un-
funded plans that would be disrupted by the inclusion of such plans
in the prohibited golden parachutes.' 98
 The FDIC responded to these
comments in the Second NPR by deleting the funding requirement.""
The final rule defines a bona fide deferred compensation plan as any
agreement under which an IAP voluntarily elects to defer his or her
compensation 20° and the bank or bank holding company either "[r]ec-
ognizes compensation expense and accrues a liability for the benefit
payments according to generally accepted accounting principles'''"' or
"segregates or otherwise sets aside assets in a trust which may only be
used to pay plan and other benefits. "202 The proposed regulation also
contains specific provisions including certain nonqualified deferred
compensation and supplemental retirement plans within the defini-
tion of bona fide deferred compensation plans. 20'
2. Severance Pay Plans
Also exempted from the definition of golden parachute payments
are certain severance pay plans. Several limitations apply to this exemp-
197 60 Fed. Reg. 16,069, 16,071 (1995).
198 id .
199 See id.
2mSpecifically, this portion of the regulation provides that a bona fide deferred compensa-
tion plan means:
any plan, contract, agreement or other arrangement whereby ... [a]n 1AP volun-
tarily elects to defer all or a portion of the reasonable compensation, wages or fees
paid for services rendered which otherwise would have been paid to such party at
the time the services were rendered (including a plan that provides for the crediting
of is reasonable investment return on such elective deferrals) ....
12 C.E.R. § 359.1 (d) (1) (1995).
In its comment letter to the Second NPR, the American Bankers Association ("ABA") noted
that the proposed regulation is unclear as to the treatment of a plan that provides for an
unreasonable investment return. This issue turns on whether an unreasonable investment return
takes the whole plan out of the bona iide exemption or just treats the unreasonable portion as
a prohibited golden parachute payment. The ABA recommended that only the unreasonable
portion of the investment return constitute a prohibited golden parachute payment. Letter from
Paul Alan Smith, Senior Federal Administrative Counsel. Federal Agency Relations, American
Bankers Association to Mr. Robert E. Feldman, Acting Executive Secretary, FDIC (May 31, 1995).
In its final rulemaking release, the FDIC confirmed that only "that portion of the investment
return which is found to he unreasonable would be a prohibited golden parachute payment." 61
Fed. Reg. 5,927 (1996).
211I 12 C.F.R. § 359.1 (d) ( 1 )(i).
2112
 M.§ 359.1(d) (1) (ii). The regulation notes that such trust assets "may be available to satisfy
claims of the institution's or holding company's creditors in the case of insolvency." Id.
2(13
 Id. § 359.I(d) (2) and (3),
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don. First, the severance pay plan must be nondiscriminatory, provid-
ing the benefits to all eligible employees.m Second, the plan must be
provided "to all eligible employees upon involuntary termination other
than for cause, voluntary resignation, or early retirement." 21• Third,
employees receiving payments under the plan may not receive more
than an amount equal to their base compensation during the twelve
months preceding their termination. Payment of greater benefits may
only be made upon consent of the FDIC. 2°6 This provision represents
a change from the rule proposed in the First NPR which provided that.
severance benefits could not exceed six months in salary. 207 Fourth, the
plan may not have been adopted or modified to increase severance
benefits at a time when the bank or bank holding company is finan-
cially troubled. 208 The FDIC eliminated the requirement set forth in
the Second NPR that no payment may be made to a senior executive
officer without providing 30 days prior written notice to the FDIC and
the AFBA. 211`'The FDIC concluded, after consideration of comments, that
"the advantages of the prior notice provision for severance payments to
senior executive officers do not outweigh the burden such a requirement
would place on the industry, so this requirement has been deIeted." 210
2nd
	 C.F.R. § 359.1(0 (2) (v). The regulation provides that "nondiscriminatory means:
What the plan, ct mtract or arrangement in question applies to all employees of [a
hank] tn. [bank holding company] who meet reasonable and customary eligibility
requirements applicable to all employees, such as minimum length of service
requirements. A mindiscriminatory plan. contract or arrangement may provide
different benefits based only on objective criteria such as salary, total compensation,
length of service, job grade or classification, which are applied on ;t proprotionate
basis .. to groups of employees consisting of not less than the lesser of 33 percent
of employees or 1,000 employees.
Id. § 359.1(j). The FDIC explains that the purpose of tins portion of the regulation is to prevent
severance pay plans that would circumvent the purpose of the regulation. 61 Fed. Reg. at 5,92H.
The FDIC elaborates, by way of example:
In other words, as an example, to permit severance payments of one year's salary
to the top five senior executive officers of an insured depository institution in
contrast to one week's salary to all tellers on the basis that such payments are made
pursuant. cu a bone fide severance pay plan, a recogniYecl exception to the gohlen
parachute prohibition, would undermine the put tpose of idle Act],
Id.
2115 Id. § 359.1(0(2)(v). This provision was changed from the proposed rule in the Second
NPR which provided Mal the severance plan must be provided in conjunction with a "reduction
in force instituted by the bank or bank holding company." 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,079 (to he codified
at 12 C.F.R. § 359.1(f)(2)(v)).
'2("1 12 C.F.R. § 359.1 (1) (2) (v).
2° 7 56 Fed. Reg. at 511,531; 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,071.
2118 12 C.F.R. §§ 359.1(1)(2)(v), 359.1(1) ( 1 ) (ii) (A)—(E). The proposed regulation reiterates
the statutory criteria regarding an institution's troubled status. See supra text accompanying notes
168-70.
2(19 00 Fed. Reg. at 1(1,08(1 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 359.1(1) (2)(v)).
2111 61 Fed. Reg. at 5,927.
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3. White Knight Exception
The new regulation provides that certain golden parachute pay-
ments are permissible. One such payment is included in the "White
Knight" exception which permits agreements to make golden para-
chute payments to the extent that the agreement is made so that the
bank or bank holding company may hire an IAP at a time when the
bank or bank holding company is or is about to be troubled finan-
cia1ly. 2" The final rule illustrates the FDIC rejection of comments to
the First and Second NPR suggesting that the White Knight exception
be extended to include current bank officers and employees who are
promoted to executive positions during a time when the institution is
troubled. 212
 In the Second NPR, the FDIC acknowledged that talented
new management can be found from within the institution but con-
cluded that:
[T] he underlying reason for allowing what would otherwise
be a prohibited golden parachute payment is not present in
the case of a current employee who is promoted to an execu-
tive position. . [T]his type of severance payment will be
approved in limited circumstances as a way to entice compe-
tent management to sever established ties with their current
employer and take a calculated risk that they can assist in
bringing a troubled institution back to financial health. This
rationale does not apply to the case of a current employee of
a troubled institution since he/she does not need to be en-
ticed to give up an established, stable career with another
employerf' 3
The FDIC reiterated the same rationale in the final rule notice. 2 ' 4
A bank or bank holding company could, on a case-by-case basis,
211 12 C.F.R. § 359.4. The regulation reiterates the statutory criteria regarding an institution's
troubled status. See supra text accompanying notes 14749. The proposed rule in the First NPR
only applied to hiring by banks or bank holding companies that were currently in troubled status.
56 Fed. Reg. at 50,531; 60 Fed. Reg. at 16072.
212 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,072; tiI Fed. Reg. at 5,928.
213 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,072. In its comment letter addressing the Second NPR, the Independent
Rankers Association ("IBA") objected to the FDIC's failure to extend the white knight exception
to current bank employees. The IBA urged, "the FDIC should not bar the possibility that a rescuer
can be found within the employee ranks as long as the employee did not contribute to the
troubled condition." Letter from Richard L. Mount, President, IRA, to Robert E. Feldman, Acting
Executive Secretary, FDIC (May 30, 1995).
214 61 Fed. Reg. at 5928.
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request the FDIC's permission to enter into an agreement with a
current employee as described above. 215
 Given the FDIC's stated
rationale, however, it appears unlikely that the FDIC will approve
such transactions.
4. Changes in Control
The new regulation allows severance payments, not exceeding
twelve months salary, to an "lAP in the event of a change in control"
of the bank, provided that the bank receive the prior consent of the
AFBA. 21" This provision was added in response to commentators to the
First NPR who suggested that certain arrangements designed to protect
executive officers in the event of a hostile takeover be exempted from
the prohibitions on golden parachute payments. 217
 They reasoned that
such arrangements ensure that executive officers' decision-making dur-
ing takeover negotiations is "not influenced by the acquisition's ulti-
mate effect on their employment." 21 " The FDIC rejected this proposed
additional exemption, reasoning that such an exemption would "open
the door to the possibility of payments being made to LIAPs1 who are
substantially responsible for the [bank's] troubled condition." 21 The
FDIC concluded that arrangements in the context of changes in con-
trol are best dealt with on a case-by-case basis—allowing such arrange-
ments only with the FDIC's prior written consent. 221'
Commentators to the Second NPR were also critical of the one-
year cap. 221 The FDIC responded:
[O] ne year's salary appears to be a reasonable compromise
between a prohibition on any payment and more generous
payments. The FDIC is of the opinion that one year's salary
will provide ample incentive for an IAP (usually a senior
executive officer) to objectively consider a takeover bid which
may result in the loss of that IAP's job. 222
215 The regulation contains a general provision allowing for banks or bank holding compa-
nies to enter into otherwise prohibited golden parachute payments with the written concurrence
of the FDIC. 12 C.F.R. § 359.9 (a) (1).
216 1d, § 359.4(a) (3).
217 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,072.
218 id.
219 Id.
220 1d. at 16,081 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 359.4(a) ( I)).
221 61 Fed. Reg. at 5,928.
2221(.
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5. Effect of the Timing of Troubled Status
The new regulation provides that the prohibitions on golden
parachute payments apply only to IAPs who terminate employment at
a time when the bank or bank holding company is troubled or in
contemplation of it becoming troubled. 223 The .result is that the regu-
lation has no impact on IAPs who, for example, begin to receive
retirement benefits prior to the institution becoming financially trou-
bled.224
 Moreover, the regulation's prohibitions would not apply to an
IAP who terminates employment after the institution is no longer
financially troubled. 225
 If, however, an lAP terminates at a time when
the institution is financially troubled and the institution regains a
healthy condition, any golden parachute payments to that IAP will
continue to be prohibited by the proposed regulation. 22" Commenters
to the Second NPR objected, arguing that safety and soundness con-
cerns would be addressed by simply suspending golden parachute
payments during the period that an institution is troubled but allowing
the payments to be made if an institution recovers despite the fact that
the lAP terminated during the troubled period. 227 The FDIC rejected
this position. The FDIC found that the regulation is consistent with the
language of the statute. 228
6. Effect on Receiverships
The new regulation will not affect the FDIC's rights when acting
as receiver. The regulation provides that:
The provisions of this part, or any consent or approval granted
the provisions of this part by the FDIC (in its corporate
223
 12 C.F.R. § 359.1 (I) (1) (ii). The proposed regulation reiterates the statutory criteria re-
garding an institution's troubled status. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
22.1 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,073.
t125
226 Id.; 61 Fed. Reg. at 5,928.
wThe general counsel of Up Financial Corp. urged that "[t]here is no evidence to support
the view that one who leaves or is terminated during the troubled period is more likely to be
substantially responsible fur the troubled condition than one leaving before or after." Letter front
Richard F. Ober, Jr., Executive Vice, President, General Counsel and Secretary, UJB Financial
Corp., to Robert E. Feldman, Acting Executive Secretary, FDIC (May 23, 1995). The General
Counsel of People's Bank argued that the "sole purpose of this ongoing prohibition would seem
to be positive, but the punishment involved here is inequitable and bears no relationship to
whether the affected 1A1' bore responsibility liter the condition of the institution." Letter front
William 'L Kosturko, General Counsel, Legal Department, People's Bank, to Robert E. Feldman,
Acting Executive Secretary, HNC (May 30, 1995).
22M
 61 Fed. Reg. at 5,928.
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capacity), shall not in any way bind any receiver of a failed
[bank]. Any consent or approval granted under the provi-
sions of this part by the FDIC or any other federal banking
agency shall not in any way obligate such agency or receiver
to pay any claim or obligation pursuant to any golden para-
chute, severance . . . or other agreement. Claims for em-
ployee welfare benefits or other benefits which are contin-
gent, even if otherwise vested, when the FDIC is appointed
as receiver for any [bank], including any contingency for
termination of employment, are not provable claims or ac-
tual, direct compensatory damage claims against such re-
ceiver.22"
The FDIC provides little insight regarding the purpose of this
provision. The Second NPR states that the fact that the FDIC or any
other banking agency consents to certain payments covered by this
regulation does not mean that the receiver will he obligated to make
such payments or that the recipient of such payments will receive a
preference over other creditors.' D
The Second NPR also fails to provide an explanation for the
purpose of the language providing that claims that are contingent at
the time the FDIC is appointed as receiver are not provable claims or
actual, direct compensatory damage claims."' It is clear, however, that
this provision is aimed at enhancing the FDIC's right as receiver to
repudiate certain con tracts. 292 Through the FDIC's statutory rights of
repudiation discussed in Part III, the FDIC has the power to repudiate
certain contracts, including, for example, severance agreements, if the
FDIC determines that the contract is burdensome. 233
 The statute pro-
vides that upon repudiation, the FDIC need only pay "actual, direct
compensatory damages"—the meaning of which is the subject of sev-
eral conflicting federal court decisions."' This portion of the proposed
regulation appears to be an attempt by the FDIC to memorialize its
interpretation of the repudiation statute in an indirectly related regu-
lation. 235
229 12 C.F.R. § 359.7 (1990).
191 60 Fed, Reg, at 16,077.
'231 See id,
232 See. infra notes 245-87 and accompanying text (discussing FDIC's statutory right to repu-
diate certain contracts).
299
	 infra notes 295-87 and accompanying text.
494 See infra notes 274-87 and accompanying text.
2" One commentator to the Second NPR described this provision as:
kiln attempt—well disguised to readers not familiar with Ihiled bank commercial
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The American Association of Bank Directors ("AABD") strongly
criticized the receivership portion of the regulation, noting that while
the regulation recognizes that some golden parachute type payments
may be beneficial to a bank, in that they enable the bank to attract or
retain qualified employees, the receivership portion of the proposed
regulation provides "that if the best efforts of these people fail and the
institution goes under, they will not be entitled to the severance and
benefits on which they relied when they agreed to work." 236 Despite this
strong criticism, this portion of the regulation as proposed in the
Second NPR is unchanged in the final version of the rule. 237 Moreover,
the FDIC does not address this issue, as it does with most other sig-
nificant comments, in its notice of final rulemaking.
III. FAILED INSTITUTIONS: FDIC's POWERS AS RECEIVER
A. FDIC's- Role as Receiver: An Overview
The powers to restrict banks' compensation practices discussed in
parts I and II are conferred on the banking agencies as regulators of
their respective financial institutions. In addition to these powers, the
FDIC acts as receiver for failed banks. 238 When a bank fails, the FDIC,
as receiver, steps into the shoes of the failed bank and is responsible
for liquidating the bank's assets and paying off creditors. 23" To recoup
losses incurred by the bank, the FDIC may rely on common law causes
of action generally available to receivers or on the express statutory
powers provided by Congress.
law but quite obvious to readers who are—to reverse by regulation the court cases
that have permitted such pay and benefits in limited circumstances against failed
institution receiverships. As FDIC knows, decisions in these cases have gone both
ways depending on the facts and the courts' varying views of the law. It is inappro-
priate to try to reverse these court decisions in this manner. FDIC is not saving
money fu r the taxpayers, because such claims are limited by the total resources of
a given receivership.
Letter from David H. Bark, Executive Director, American Association of Bank Directors
("AABD"), to Robert E. Feldman, Acting Executive Secretary, FDIC (May 26, 1995). See infra part
111.13.1.a–b (discussing court cases on this issue).
236 Letter from David H. Bark, Executive Director, AABD, to Robert E. Feldman, Acting
Executive Secretary, FDIC (May 26, 1995).
237 See supra text accompanying note 180.
238 The FDIC must act as receiver fin; a failed national bank. The FDIC has the option to take
over as receiver for a failed state-chartered bank. 12 U.S.C. § 144 la(m) (1) (1996); id. § 1813(j).
219 0'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994). For a general discussion of the
distinction between the FDIC's role as receiver and its role as insurer, see Bullion Servs., Inc. v.
Valley State Bank, 50 F.3d 705, 709 (9th Cir. 1995) and FDIC v. Godshall, 558 F.2d 220, 221 n.3
(4th Cir. 1977) and HMG a Abraham, 439 E Stipp, 1150, 1151-52 (E.D. La. 1977).
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In the context of compensation practices, the FDIC, as receiver,
may sue former officers or directors of a failed bank for breach of
fiduciary duty arising out of compensation paid to the former bank
officials.2 `I 0
 While this power is considerable, it is beyond the scope of
this article, since the power exercised by the FDIC in such cases is not
fundamentally different than the power of a receiver of any non-bank
corporation to sue for breaches of fiduciary duty."' Peculiar to the
FDIC's role as receiver, however, are the many statutory powers that
extend beyond what would be available under common law. 242
 As dis-
cussed below, the FDIC's statutory power to repudiate contract obliga-
tions has a significant impact upon banks' compensation practices.
B. Repudiation of Contract Obligations
Under section 1821(e) of the FDIA, as amended by the Financial
Institutions Reform Recovery Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"),
Congress empowered the FDIC, when acting as receiver for a failed
bank, to repudiate contracts to which the failed bank is a party. 24" The
FDIC may exercise this statutory authority if it determines, in its dis-
cretion, that the contract is burdensome244
 and the repudiation will
promote the orderly administration of the institution's affairs. 245 The
24° For a general discussion of common law relating to "excessive" compensation, see gener-
ally Elson, supra note 11, at 938; Barris, 511Pro note 12, at 76.
211
 For a discussion of the possible statutory preemption its fiduciary duty cases, see Schooner,
supra note 25, at 182-84.
212 The term "receiver" means "a receiver, liquidating agent, conservator, commission, per-
son, or other agency charged by law with the duty of winding up the affairs of a hank or savings
association or of a branch of a foreign bank." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(j). The FDIC serves as receiver
for tithed conunercial banks. Id. § 1441(a) (m) ( ). Prior to its dissolution on December 31, 1995,
the lac served as receiver for failed savings associations. Id.
215
 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (1996).
24-1 1d. § 1821(c)(1)(11). In Union Bank v. FSLIC, 724 F. Supp. 468, 470-71 (E.D. Ky. 1989),
the court rejected the argument that a contract is "burdensome" only when it will cause actual
loss to the institution. The court found that the "conservator may repudiate a contract the
performance of which the conservator believes, in his discretion, would be detrimental to the
conservation of the assets of the institution." Id. at 471. In an unpublished decision, the Fourth
Circuit has held that the determination of burdensomeness is limited to the issue of whether the
receiver abused its discretion. Atlantic Mechanical, Inc. v. RTC, No. 91-1500, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 904, al *6-8 (4th Cir. Jan. 27, 1992). The FDIC's discretion in determining burdensome-
ness has been interpreted broadly in compensation cases. See Monrad v. FDIC, No. 95-56221, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 20700, at *7-8 (9th Cir. Mar. Ii, 1995).
216 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (e) (1) (C). Whether the receiver or conservator has repudiated within a
reasonable time depends upon the circumstances of the case. RTC v. Cedarminn Bldg, Ltd.
Partnership, 956 F.2d 1446, 1455 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 830 (1992); Union Bank v.
FSLIC, 724 E Stipp. 468, 471 (E.D. Ky. 1989). The Second and Eighth Circuits have both held
that the FDIC and RTC have a reasonable period to exercise their power of repudiation following
appointment as receiver, even if they previously acted as conservator for the saint
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FDIC must exercise its right to repudiate within a "reasonable period"
following its appointment as receiver or conservator. 246 If the FDIC
makes the decision to repudiate a contract, it will be liable for clam-
ages.217
 The FDIC's liability, however, is limited to "actual, direct com-
pensatory damages "248 determined as of the date of its appointment. as
receiver or conservator. 249 "Actual, direct compensatory damages" does
not include punitive or exemplary damages, damages for lost profits
or opportunity or damages for pain and suffering. 2"
Compensation arrangements have generated considerable litiga-
tion under section 1821(e). 251
 As discussed below, many cases have
arisen as a result of the FDIC's unwritten policy of refusing to pay
severance claims made by employees of failed banks. 252 Other cases
have arisen from the FDIC's refusal to pay certain retirement benefits.
Two legal issues govern the analysis in these cases. First, courts have
considered the scope of the FDIC's authority to repudiate contracts.
Second, courts have considered whether, assuming the repudiation was
authorized by the statute, the FDIC is liable for damages.
1. Scope of the FDIC's Authority to Repudiate
The first question the courts have considered in cases dealing
with the FDIC's attempt to repudiate compensation arrangements is
whether the FDIC has the authority to repudiate. This issue has cen-
tered on whether the FDIC may repudiate executory contracts 2'" but
1185 Ave, of the Ams. Assocs. v. RTC, 22 F.36 494, 498 (2d Cir. 1994); Cedarmina, 956 E2d at.
1451-52. The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Cedarminn suggests that the party challenging the
repticliati101 must show some prejudice to prove that the time the FDIC. or RTG expended was
unreasonable. 950 F.2d at 1455-56.
246 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (2).
247 Id. § 1821(e) (3).
248 kl.§ 1821(e) (3)(A)(i).
215 Id. § 1821(e)(3) (A). Damages incurred on or after the receiver or conserrator's appoint-
ment are not recoverable. See Office & Prat Employees Intl Union v. FDIC, 813 F. Supp. 39, 42
(D.D.C. 1993). But see Employee Retirement Sys. V. RTC, 840 F. Supp. 972. 985 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (court used date of repudiation, despite "literal terms of the statute" because both parties
to suit assumed that date as proper one for determination of damages). Damages for certain
qualified financial contracts are determined as of the date of repudiation. 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1821(e) (3) (A) (ii), (e) (8).
2"	 § 1821(c) (3) (13.).
'251 Sect ion 1821(c) has also generated considerable litigation with regard to 'natty other types
of contracts. See generally Carol Anne Sennello, Note, FIRREA's Damage Provisions: Inequitable,
Ureneressary, and Cosily to 13oot, 45 DUKE Li. 183 (1995).
252 see, e.g., Hennessy v. FDIC, 858 F. Supp. 483, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
2" An executory contract is one "under which neither party has perkirmed his or her
obligation under the contract." LaMagna v. FDIC, 828 F. Stipp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1993).
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not nonexecutory25 t contracts on the theory that allowing the FDIC to
repudiate a nonexecutory contract, i.e., one where the plaintiff has
already performed, leads to draconian results.2'5 The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia has concluded that section
1821(e) permits the FDIC to repudiate executory contracts, but not
contracts where the plaintiff (employee, in the context of compensa-
tion cases) has performed:25" Other courts have been reluctant to adopt
the distinction because the statute does not distinguish between execu-
tory and nonexecutory contracts.257 Some courts have avoided deciding
the issue because the distinction does not impact the result of the
case, 258 i.e., the FDIC must pay the same damages whether or not the
court finds that it has the statutory authority to repudiate the con-
tract. 259
In Fresca v. FDIC, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York provided one of the more complete analyses of
this issue (although the court declined ultimately to decide the is-
sue). 26° The court examined the statutory language allowing the FDIC
to "disaffirm or repudiate" contracts. The court explained: "Both terms
suggest a stage of the contract where performance on the part of the
FDIC is not yet due. In other words, repudiation entails an anticipatory
breach, taking place before the triggering event occurs which would
cause the other party's rights to vest."21i 1 The court concluded that the
FDIC has the authority to repudiate executory contracts, which it
defined as "contracts where rights of the parties have not vested." 262
The court, however, questioned the FDIC's power to repudiate con-
tracts where the rights of the employee have vested, i.e., nonexecutory
25 ' 1 A nonexecutory contract is "one under which liability for performance has accrued
because one party has pet - lint -tied his or her contractual obligations." Id.
255 See Fresca v. FDIC, 8l8 F. Supp. 664, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The result, however, does not
seem particularly draconian when one considers that § 1821(c) requites the FDIC to pay damages
when it repudiates a contract. 12 U.S.C.1:1 1821(e) (3) (1996).
256 LaMagna, 828 K Stipp. at 2.
257 Morton v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 836 F. Stipp. 477, 481 (N.D. III. 1993)
("We would be loathe to read the word 'executory' into the statute unless to omit it would lead
to an absurd or unjust result"); Majeski v. RTC, No. 94-738, 1995 WL 115953, *3 (D.D.C. Feb.
28, 1995) ( R REA explicitly gives the receiver discretion to disaffirm or repudiate 'any contract'
and does not limit that discretion to situations involving executory contracts.").
2514 Marsa v, Metrohank for Say., ESA., 825 F. Stipp, (158, 666 (D.N.J. 1903); Fresca v, FDIC,
818 F. Stipp. 664, 668-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
299 Because the statute places limitations on recoverable damages, however, the acceptance
of this distinction could be important in some cases, See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying
text (discussing . limitation or damages to "actual, direct compensatory damages").
26"Fresca, 818 F. Supp. at 668-69.
21" Id. at (168.
2112 Id.
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contracts.263
 The court ultimately dismissed this issue since it would not
affect the outcome of the case, i.e., the plaintiffs would receive the
same damages if the court found that the FDIC had the power to
repudiate the contract or if the court found that the FDIC did not. 264
As discussed above, in many cases the question of whether section
1821(e) allows the repudiation of nonexecutory contracts proves non-
dispositive. Still, the analysis may have importance in addressing the
issue of damages discussed below. The Fresca decision suggests that
Congress, by using the terms "disaffirm or repudiate," contemplated
the repudiation of contracts where the rights of the parties have not
yet vested. As discussed below, the question of whether or not the
plaintiff's rights under the contract have vested is an important issue
in some cases addressing the issue of what damages are due under
section 1821(c).
2. Damages for Repudiation
In compensation cases, courts have considered two issues in de-
termining whether the FDIC is liable for damages under the statute.
The first question is whether, as a threshold matter, the plaintiff has
incurred.any damages. The resolution of this question usually revolves
around the question of whether or not the plaintiff's rights under the
repudiated contract vested prior to the appointment of the FDIC as
receiver. Even if the plaintiff satisfies the court that he or she has
incurred some damage, the issue remains whether the damages claims
are actual, direct compensatory damages or damages that are not
recoverable under the statute, such as punitive or exemplary dam-
ages.265
 Below is a discussion of each of these issues.
a. Did the Plaintiff Incur Damages?
Damages owed by the FDIC under section 1821(e) are determined
as of the date of its appointment as receiver. Therefore, courts have
addressed whether or not, as of that date, the plaintiff has any claim
for damages. 2" In Office and Professional Employees International Union
Local 2 v. FDIC, the District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether
the FDIC, acting as receiver for The National Bank of Washington
26 ' Id.
264 Id. at 669.
2"5 See infire notes 274-87 and accompanying tem.
266
 If the court determines that the plaintiff incurred damages as of that date, then the court
must determine whether those damages are the type of damages recoverable under the statute,
i.e., actual, direct compensatory damages.
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("NBW"), was liable for severance payments under a collective bargain-
ing agreement which the FDIC repudiated. 267 Relying on the statutory
requirement that damages for repudiation be determined as of the
date of the appointment of the receiver, the FDIC asserted that the
NBW employees were not entitled to damages because their right to
severance pay had not accrued at the time of the appointment of the
FDIC as NBW's receiver.' This argument was based upon the fact that
the employees were not entitled to severance pay until termination of
their employment for economic reasons, and the employees were not
so terminated until after the FDIC was appointed receiver. The court
rejected the FDIC's argument, finding that the right to severance
payments was vested prior to termination. 269 The court reasoned that
although the employer's obligation to pay under a severance agree-
ment "attaches only if an employee was [sic] laid off for economic
reasons, it can hardly be suggested that this sort of protection lacks any
immediate value."270 Conversely, in Hennessy v. .FDIC, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania came to the opposite conclusion. In Hennessy, the
court found that severance benefits did not vest where employees were
not terminated prior to the FDIC's appointment as receiver. 271
Arguably, however, the focus of this issue has gone astray. In
recalling the Southern District of New York's decision in Fresca, the
emphasis on whether or not the plaintiff's rights had vested at a
particular point in time appears misplaced. 272 As the court in Fresca
indicated, the language of section 1821(e) suggests that contracts un-
der which rights have not yet vested are the only types of contracts
which Congress granted the FDIC the authority to repudiate.273 Since
267 27 FM 598,601 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
268 Id. at 600.
269 /d. at 601. The court noted, however, that the value of the employee's vested rights, at
any time prior to termination, must be "discounted for the risk that the employees would not be
discharged for economic reasons, for instance, that the employees would quit, retire, die, or be
discharged for misconduct." Id.; see also Majeski, 1995 V11. 115953, at *3 (plaintiff's right to
retirement benefits vested as of the appointment of the RTC as receiver); LaMagna, 828 P. Supp.
at 3 (plaintiff's severance benefits vested upon signing of the severance agreement); Marsa, 825
E. Stipp. at 664 (plaintiff's rights under a settlement agreement had already vested at the time of
appointment of the RTC as receiver).
27" OPL'IU, 27 F.3d at 602.
271 858 F. Supp. 483,487 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Even after concluding that the plaintiff's rights had
not vested prior to the receivership, the court includes in its opinion an analysis of whether the
damages claimed by the plaintiff are the type of damages recoverable under the statute. Id. at
488-89. This perhaps indicates that the court did not view the question of vesting as dispositive
on the damages question.
272 See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
273 See .supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
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it is clear that Congress intended the FDIC to be liable for at least some
damages for repudiation, interpreting the statute to require that con-
tract rights must be vested in order to claim such damages would make
the statute internally inconsistent. Perhaps, by including in the statute
the requirement that the damages for repudiation be determined as
of the date of the FDIC's appointment as receiver, Congress merely
intended to limit the further accrual of damages following the receiv-
ership. The limitation of further accrual of damages could be signficant
in certain cases—for example, with any contract calling for the pay-
ment of interest charges. In the case of severance benefits, however,
which are generally payable in one lump sum, there is no further
accrual problem, i.e., the damages do not grow over time.
b. Are the Damages Actual Direct Compensatory Damages?
At least three federal circuit courts have considered the question
of whether the FDIC's repudiation of a severance agreement results in
actual, direct compensatory damages under section 1821(e). The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit first addressed this issue
in Howell v. PD/C.274 In Howell, four officers of Eliot Savings Bank
entered into severance agreements under which the bank agreed to
pay each officer—the equivalent of three year's salary for one of the
officers and one year's salary for each of the other three officers—if
their employment were terminated. While the agreements did not
obligate the officers to remain at the bank for any fixed term, the hank
promised to make the severance payments "in consideration of the
officers' `willingness to remain' in the bank's employ."27' Less than a
year later, the bank failed, and the FDIC was appointed as its receiver. 276
The FDIC repudiated the severance agreements. In the ensuing litiga-
tion, the central issue on appeal was whether the amounts due under
the severance agreements constituted actual direct compensatory dam-
274 986 F.2d 569,573 (1st Cir. 1993). The First Circuit, in addressing a broad range of issues,
has relied upon its decision in . HowelL See, e.g., DPJ Co. Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC, 30 F.3d 247,
248-49 (1st Cir. 1994); Lawson v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 11,14-15 (1st Cir. 1993); Deno v. FDIC, 996 F.2d
429,433 (1st Cir. 1993).
275
 Howell, 986 F.2d at 570. The court indicates that the agreements did not alter the at will"
nature of the employment relationship between the bank and the officers, since the bank could
terminate the officers at any time, and the officers could leave the bank's employ at any time. Id.
The court's observation on this point is perplexing. The severance arrangements appear to have
had a significant effect on the at will nature of the employment contract, since the arrangements
alter the consequences of either party's termination without cause, i.e., if the bank terminated
the employee, the bank had to pay severance; if the employee quit, the employee forfeited the
severance payment.
276
 Id, at 571.
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ages under section 1821(e). The First Circuit concluded that the amounts
due under the severance agreements did not constitute actual, direct
compensatory damages. The court reasoned:
Severance payments, stipulated in advance, are at best an
estimate of likely harm made at. a time when only prediction
is possible. When discharge actually occurs, the employee
may have no way to prove the loss from alternative employ-
ments foregone, not to mention possible disputes about the
discharged employee's ability to mitigate damages by finding
new employment. A severance agreement properly protects
against these uncertainties by liquidating the liability. Such
payments comprise or are analogous to "liquidated damages,"
at least when the amount is not so large as to constitute an
unenforceable penalty ... .
Unfortunately for the appellants, the statutory language—
"actual, direct compensatory damages"—did not quite em-
brace the payments promised by the officers' severance agree-
ment. Eliot's officers may, or may not, have suffered injury by
remaining at the bank, depending on what options they had
in the past that were not available at the time of severance.
Conceivably, they suffered no damage at all; conceivably, their
actual damages from staying at Eliot exceed the amounts
stipulated in the agreements. The point is that severance
payments of this class do not comprise actual damages. 277
The First Circuit's characterization of the amounts due under the
severance agreements as liquidated damages is mistaken. 278 Liquidated
damages represent the contracting parties' agreement, prior to breach,
as to the remedy for breach of their contract. 279 If severance payments
were a form of liquidated damages, the severance payment would
represent the employer's and employee's estimate of the damages
owed to the employee for the employer's breach of the employment
contract. The employment contract in Howell, however, was an al-will
contract—as are most employment contracts. Under an at-will con-
2" Id. at 573 (citations omitted).
278 At least one district court, however, has fiillowed the First Circuit's decision. See, e.g.,
Hennessy, 858 F. Stipp. at 487; see also Credit Life Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 870 F. Supp. 417, 425 (D.N.1-1.
1993) (citing Howell for proposition dial once contract is disaffirmed or repudiated, the disaffir-
mance is treated as breach or contact); Morse, 825 F. Supp. at 666; Freya, 818 Supp. at 670.
279 See generally F.. AI,LAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.18 (2d ed. 1990). As the court
indicated, the principal restriction on liquidated damages is that such damages may not he so
large as to constitute a penalty. Id.
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tract, the employer would not be obligated to pay the employee dam-
ages for termination. It is precisely because the employer would not
ordinarily owe the employee anything in the event of termination, that
an employer may agree to pay some fixed amount to the employee as
an incentive for the employee to remain on the job.'" Severance
arrangements provide the employee with an incentive to stay on the
job because the severance benefits are not payable to the employee if
the employee quits.
The other circuit courts that have addressed this issue, 281 most
importantly the United States Courts of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, demonstrate a more precise
understanding of the nature of severance arrangements. In Office and
Professional Employees International Union ("OPEIU") Local 2 v. FDIC,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
rejected the First Circuit's conclusion that severance pay did not con-
stitute actual direct compensatory damages."' The District of Colum-
bia Circuit reasoned that the Howell decision overlooked the fact that
"an employer's promise to make severance payments is part of the
consideration of the employment contract."'" The court concluded
that the severance arrangement was a modification of the at-will rela-
tionship and, therefore, gave rise to compensable damages under the
statute.'" In Monrad v. FDIC, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit followed the decision in OPEIU, finding the FDIC
liable for severance pay as an actual direct compensatory damage.'"
Arguably, the difference between the results in Howell, OPEIU,
and Monrad can be explained on the basis of their facts. The claims of
the plaintiffs in Howell appear far less compelling than the plaintiffs'
claims in OPEIU and Monrad. The plaintiffs in Howell were four bank
officers who entered into agreements that provided them with a pay-
ment of one year's salary upon their termination. Apparently, there
280
 This was the stated purpose of the severance arrangements in Howell. See supra note 275
and accompanying text.
281 See also RTC v. Management, Inc., 25 F.3d 627, 631-32 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Howell for
propositions that: (I) repudiation is normally treated as breach of contract that gives rise to
ordinary contract claim for damages; (2) by repudiating contract, lac is freed from duty of
compliance; and (3) neither severance fees nor future lost profits are compensable under
FIRREA).
282 27 F.3d 598, 604 (D.D.C. 1994).
283 1d. at 603.
284 Id. at 609.
282 62 F.3d 1169, 1170 (9th Cir. 1995). The court also rejected the FMC's argument that
OPEIU was distinguishable because the severance pay in that case was part of a collective
bargaining agreement. See id. at 1173.
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was some suggestion by the FDIC that the agreements themselves were
the result of improper insider influence "to assure themselves of a
handsome farewell gift from a failing bank."286 In contrast, the plaintiffs
in both OPEILland Monrad were recipients of severance benefits under
umbrella bank policies, not special arrangements made for their indi-
vidual benefit. The OPEIU and Monrad decisions make no mention of
the possibility that such policies were improper or that the plaintiffs
had any influence in setting such policies.
Any such factual distinctionS between the cases, however, should
not have affected their outcome. The FDIC's power to repudiate is not
an enforcement tool and should not be used to remedy abusive com-
pensation arrangements. If the FDIC concludes that a severance ar-
rangement is legally objectionable, i.e., an unsafe or unsound banking
practice or a breach of fiduciary duty, the proper forum for such a
determination would be through the institution of formal enforcement
action. 2"
IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE REGULATION OF BANKS'
COMPENSATION PRACTICES
The extensive288 government regulation of banks' compensation
practices is a testament to the interest of lawmakers in this issue. The
question remains whether the regulation is effective in balancing safety
and soundness concerns with banks' need to compete in an increas-
ingly competitive market for skilled professional talent. Part IV evalu-
ates the agencies' limitations on compensation practices detailed in
parts I, II and III by identifying and evaluating the primary assump-
tions regarding, and approaches toward, compensation that provide
the foundations for regulatory intervention in this area of banks'
internal operations.
A. The Impact of Compensation Practices on. Banks' Safety
and Soundness
Compensation practices are just one of the many kinds of banks'
internal operations that draw regulatory scrutiny. As with other inter-
nal operations, the agencies' concern with compensation practices
286 See Howell, 986 F.2d at 573.
287 See supra notes 44-106 (discussing agencies' use of administrative en tbrcement powers in
cases involving compensation arrangements).
288 Regulation of . banks' compensation practices is certainly extensive when compared to the
little regulation imposed on other non-bank companies. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying
text.
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stems from the agencies' charge to preserve banks' safety and sound-
ness. The following section discusses the link between compensation
practices and safety and soundness.
The enforcement. actions discussed in part I that are based upon
claims that the compensation paid by the bank was "excessive" provide
illumination of' the regulatory interest in compensation practices. The
agencies provide no definition for "excessive" in this context, but the
term "excessive" could reasonably be interpreted as any amount that
would impact a bank's financial condition. 289 This definition, however,
would not likely satisfy a regulator's goal of preserving the safety and
soundness of' a bank. A review of the excessive compensation cases
brought by the agencies does not reveal consistent findings that the
compensation paid impacted the bank's capital or liquidity, i.e., its
financial condition. 29" Rather, it is unlikely that such a showing could
be made except in cases involving the most outrageous salaries paid by
an institution on the brink of insolvency. 29 '
The regulatory concern with "excessive" payments, however, may
extend well beyond a concern for the bank's bottom line. First, a
bank's willingness to make "excessive" payments to certain officials may
evidence a pattern of conduct in which bank management ignores the
well-being of the bank in favor of its own interests (even if the bank
can "afford" to pay the high salaries). Second, regulators have tradi-
tionally shown concern regarding the public's perception of the finan-
cial stability of banks. 2" 2
 Regardless of whether providing a bank CEO
with a multimillion dollar compensation package would actually im-
pact the financial condition of a bank, the agencies may be concerned
that the public's confidence in banks may be undermined by such
practices.'"
2S9 The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of "unsafe or unsound banking practices" would man-
date a finding that the practices had a "reasonably direct etTect on [a financial institution's]
financial soundness." Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2(1 259,
264 (5th Cir. 1981), cart. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982). The agencies, however, have not adopted
this limitation on the definition of "unsafe or unsound banking practices." See supra note 50.
29u While the agencies may relate the amount of compensation to a bank's financial condi-
don, see supra note 56 and accompanying text, the agencies may look alternatively to other Factors
to determine excessiveness. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
291 See generally Ekon, supra note 11, at 949-50 (discussing impact of executive compensation
on company's earnings).
292
 See investment Co. hist. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 631 (1971) ("[I]liblic confidence is
essential to the solvency ()I' a bank . . .").
293
 Many corporate executives ;ire compensated with stock incentives, the payment of which
does not impact the bottom line. This method of compensation, however, has not escaped public
scrutiny. See, Sarah liumat, Executive Pay (a Special Report): Enough! Shareholders Like the Idea
of Using Stock as a Pay Incentive; But Now, Some Say, It Has Gone Too Ear, WAu, ST. J., Apr. 11,
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With the regulators' general interest in compensation practices as
a backdrop, the remainder of this part discusses the specific foundations
for the regulators' approach toward limiting compensation practices.
B. Compensation Used to Attract and Retain Employees
The banking agencies are cognizant of the tension between their
goal of preserving banks' safety and soundness and the banks' need to
attract, retain and motivate qualified employees. 204
 Because compensa-
tion is considered one of the factors affecting employers' ability to
attract, retain and motivate their employees, the banking agencies
must exercise caution in regulating compensation policies so that the
regulation does not impede banks' ability to compete for human capi-
tal..As discussed below, the FDIC, however, has adopted a strict liability
approach to the enforceability of severance agreements, i.e., it has
rendered such agreements unenforceable in many instances without
any finding of culpability on the part of the bank or its employees. As
discussed below, this approach will likely impact negatively banks'
ability to attract and retain employees.
FDIC regulations and practices demonstrate an animosity toward
the enforceability of severance pay plans in the event a bank is insol-
vent or lands in receivership. 2"5
 Criticism of this approach would be
difficult if the FDIC targeted only severance pay plans that were "abu-
sive," i.e., entered into without regard to the safety and soundness of
the bank. 2N The FDIC, however, has not limited its intervention in this
fashion. FDIC regulations limit a bank's ability to set severance pay-
ments or render severance pay plans unenforceable in the event of a
bank's insolvency or receivership regardless of whether the plan is the
result of any culpable conduct on the part of the bank or its officers.
For example, the FDIC's new golden parachute regulation would re-
quire prior agency approval of any severance pay plan allowing for
benefits that exceed one year's base compensation. The foundation for
1996, at Rii; Business Brief BankAmerica Corp.: Stock-Based Plan Adqrted for Executive Compensa-
tion, WALt. ST. J., Mar. 28, 1995, at C19; see also Jay Mathews, Caution: Highly Paid Boss; Study
Links Executive Pay to Risk Avoidance, WAsts. Pos-r, May 1, 1996, at Fl (questioning whether
executives who own large portions of their company's stuck hccome overly cautious 63T fear
"cracking II ieir nest. egg").
'.41 " See joint Advance Notice o f Proposed Rtilemaking on Standards for Safety and Soundness,
57 Fed. Reg. 31,337 (1992).
•r, See .supra part 1.13.1 (discussing OTS's regulation of employment contracts); part 11.8.2
(discussing the FDIC's golden parachute restrictions); part 11,B (discussing the FDIC's power to
repudiate severance and other contracts providing compensation).
296 See supra part I.A.2 (discussing agency enforcement actions targeting compensation prac-
tices as unsafe or unsound banking practices).
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this portion of the regulation must be that severance pay plans provid-
ing for greater benefits are presumptively suspect. 297 The FDIC has not
provided data or explanation regarding why plans offering greater
benefits should be subject to this limitation. This leaves the disconcert-
big impression that the limitation is somewhat arbitrary. In addition,
while the FDIC quite sensibly created an exception to the golden
parachute prohibitions for contracts made with "white knights," the
FDIC refused to extend the exception to current bank employees. 298
The FDIC's rationale is that this exception is not needed with respect
to current employees because they do not need to be "enticed to give
up an established stable career with another employer."m This ration-
ale ignores the obvious fact that a bank's best employees are likely to
have options for employment outside of their current situation, which
may appear more and more attractive as their own bank's financial
condition falters. It seems fundamental that troubled banks should be
given the flexibility to craft employee incentives, be it compensation,
promotions or other means, that will enable them to retain their best
talent during troubled times.
Perhaps more troubling is the FDIC's position that its repudiation
of severance agreements upon a bank's receivership does not result in
actual direct compensatory damages which would be recoverable un-
der section 1821(e) of the FDIA. 3"° In repudiation cases, described in
part III, the FDIC is not required to prove any culpable conduct in
connection with the severance agreement, as it would in an enforce-
ment action described in part L 3°'In these cases, the FDIC is operating
not as a regulator, but in its capacity as a receiver, the duty of which is
to liquidate the bank's assets and pay off creditors. The problem that
the FDIC's position creates with respect to a hank's ability to attract
and retain the best employees is quite simple. Current or prospective
nu Certainly, we would stiffer no heartache in seeing this regulation applied to the bank CEO
with a million dollar annual salary. See, e.g., Nikhil Deogun, First Union Takeover of First Fidelity
to Bring Thrracciano Large Payments, WALL ST. j,, Sept. 5, 1995, at A9 (discussing Mr. Terracciano's
pending annual salary and bonus of not less than $2,000,000, regardless of whether or not he
leaves First Union—either voluntarily or involuntarily). The regulation, however, looks very
different from the perspective of a teller earning a very modest salary who has been an employee
with the bank for many years.
255 See supra part 11.11,3.
255 60 Fed. Reg. 16,072.
") See supra part II1.13.2. The FDIC's new golden parachute regulations make clear that this
is the FD1C's current position. See supra part 11.B.6. This is despite a split in the circuits on this
issue. See supra part III.B.2.
3431 M. least one court has criticized the RTG for insinuating culpability on the part of
respondents where there was no evidence in the record. See supra note 136; see also supra note
275 and accompanying text (discussing the Howell decision).
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bank employees might reasonably seek to negotiate some form of
compensation for the risk they incur in staying employed by, or accept-
ing employment with, a financially troubled bank (or any bank oper-
ating in a troubled economic market). Because, in the event of a
receivership, the FDIC will take the position that it can repudiate
severence pay plans without any obligation to pay damages, banks, in
effect, are prevented from using such contracts as part of an enticing
compensation package.
C. Comparison of Banks' Compensation Practices to the Compensation
Practices of Their Competitors
The current regulation of banks' compensation practices reveals
an assumption by the regulators that one of the appropriate ways to
evaluate a bank's compensation practices (primarily for purposes of
maintaining banks' safety and soundness) is to compare banks' prac-
tices to those of their competitors. The regulators have used this
comparison as a basis for the finding of "excessive" compensation
constituting unsafe or unsound banking practices in formal enforce-
ment proceedings.3"2
 The agencies' interest in the comparison of com-
pensation practices between banks and their competitors is not limited,
however, to the expediencies of proving violations of law by a respon-
dent bank in an enforcement proceeding. The agencies also show an
interest in the comparison for the proactive purpose of improving
banks' internal operations (and thereby avoiding unsafe or unsound
banking practices). Agency orders directing a review of a bank's com-
pensation policies often direct the bank to consider the policies of
other financial institutions. 3"3 Most recently, the OCC's Handbook on
Emerging Market Country Products and Trading Activities directs banks'
senior management, among other things, to consider "competitors'
compensation packages for similar responsibilities and performance"
in establishing and reviewing compensation programs. 3"4
Ostensibly, the comparison of a bank's compensation policies to
its competitors' policies is useful because it enables a regulator (or the
bank itself) to determine whether its compensation policies serve to
302 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. As discussed supra part I, this comparison
can he used to satisfy the part of the definition of "unsafe or unsound flanking practices" which
requires a finding that the conduct is "cull nary to accepted standards of banking operations."
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
3(" See 0CC, COMPYR01,I,ER'S HANDBOOK: EMERGING MARKET COUNTRY PRODUCTS AND
TRAnit4c; Acrivrms 18 (1995).
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attract and retain quality employees or whether the policies tend to
overcompensate employees as compared to their peers in other insti-
tutions. The use of such comparisons, however, can be problematic.
First, as a practical matter, it may prove difficult to obtain the data
necessary for comparison, or, even if the data is obtained, to use the
data as a basis For comparison.° For example, the job of a vice presi-
dent in commercial lending in one bank may involve significantly
different tasks and responsibilities from a job bearing the same title at
a similarly situated financial institution. This obviously creates prob-
lems, although not necessarily insurmountable ones, in comparing the
compensation paid to each. Second, compensation is an area of inter-
nal operations that is likely as amenable to innovation as any other area
of bank operations. Therefore, banks, and other companies, should not
necessarily be encouraged to follow simply the practices of their com-
petitors (to satisfy regulators) when an innovative approach to com-
pensation could prove a valuable part of the bank's competitive edge
in a competitive marketplace. 301 '
This is not meant to suggest that the regulators should encourage
banks to ignore the compensation practices of their competitors3"7 or
that comparisons of practices within the industry are meaningless in
identifying safety and soundness concerns. 3" Rather, regulators should
exercise care in relying on such comparisons as a means of evaluation.
Recent literature encourages all corporate boards, not just bank boards,
to focus questions of compensation on the unique and current needs
of their institutions rather than on industry practices."'"
3415
 &V MARC J. WALLACE & CHARLES H. FAY, COMPENSATION THEORY AND PRACTICE '28-49
(2d ed. 1988) (discussing use of external market data in setting compensation policies); see also
Lauren Young, Executive Pay (A Special Report): Compare and Contrast: More Pay Plans Are Linked
to How Well a Corporation bares Against Its Wats; the Problem: Finding an Appropriate Rival, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 11,1996, at R8.
5"6 The recent use of sophisticated stock options and financial derivatives in compensation
programs is evidence of the potential for innovation in this area. See Millstein, supra note 12, ;It
1437.
:4"7 Compensation theorists Wallace and Pay put it best:
lAJ company that consistently pays wage rates below those prevailing in the external
marketplace will find its ability to attract qualified employees in sufficient numbers
and on a timely basis diminished. Eventually, they will be unable to attract any
employees. Conversely, most employers who consistently pay more for labor than
their competitors will lose a competitive edge and may either price their product
out of the market or fail to make sufficient profits.
WALLACE & FAY, supra note 305, at '29.
3138 While the failure of a bank to have compensation practices in line with its competitors
may be a sign of the hank's ability to innovate, it could also be a sign of insider abuses.
"A recent article:
Certainly the hoard can develop strategy as to executive compensation to a greater
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D. Regulation of the Process Versus the Package
Parts I, II and III of this article illustrate the agencies' abilities to
limit the content of compensation colitracts. 31 ° Congress has given the
agencies the power to take the position that the bank is paying its
executives, directors and employees "too much" and should not be
permitted to do so. This approach puts the agencies in the position of
scrutinizing the business judgments of bank managers relating to com-
pensation. The following discussion questions whether the agencies'
involvement in these types of business judgments is appropriate.
To the extent that there exists a problem in corporate America
with overcompensationm of executives,m 2
 it stems from the structure
of corporate governance. Professor Derek Bok described the problem
as follows:
Most top executives are in an unusually strong position to
strike a favorable bargain, because they exert such influence
over the process. CEOs almost always serve as chairman of
the hoard. They typically have a good deal to say about the
choice of new board members. They are the key people who
decide on the fees paid to the directors, fees that average over
$40,000 for only a few clays of work each year. They often
choose the consultant who presents recommendations on
their next pay increase to the board—and most consultants
are only too aware that candor, restraint, frugality, and other
Puritan virtues may not be warmly remembered when it conies
to picking a successor for the following year. In this environ-
ment, the task of fixing the compensation of top executives
extent than is found in current practice. To do so, however, will require less reliance
on industry 'standards' (what is everyone else paying), and more focus on compen-
sation tied to share price and other indicators of performance unique to
COrp(tratithl.
Millstein„wrilm note 12, at 1436.
311)
 For examples, see part I.A.2,a(1)—(2) (discussing enforcement actions alleging excessive
compensation and certain incentives as an unsafe or unsound banking practice); part 1.A.2.b( )
(discussing cease and desist orders that limit compensation practices); part II.A (discussing
on compensation for officers of undercapitalized institutions); part 11.B (discussing limitations
on golden parachute payments).
311 Some commentators take the position that there is no problem regarding executive
overcompensation. See, generally Elson, supra note 11, at 939 n.7 (citing various sources of this
position).
312
 While this article is not necessarily limited to a discussion of executive compensation,
abusive compensation practices tend to arise at the executive level. The banking industry does
not face headline news on excessive salaries for tellers or commercial loan officers.
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is hardly an arms-length transaction comparable to setting the
salaries of middle managers and other kinds of employees. 313
Commentators have suggested various solutions to the conflicts of
interests described by Professor Bak. These solutions focus on aligning
decisions regarding compensation to the interests of shareholders rather
than the interests of corporate executives. Proposals for reform in-
clude: compensation of outside directors in stock only; 314 increased
involvement of institutional investors who have the incentive and re-
sources to ensure that compensation plans are directed toward share-
holder interests;315
 changes in board composition to diffuse the power
of the CE0;316
 and alignment of compensation with share price and
other performance indicators. 317
Some agency efforts appear aimed toward eliminating the self-in-
terest motivation from compensation decisions. For example, as dis-
cussed above,sth some cease and desist orders call for the assistance of
outside consultants in the development of compensation plans.'" Other
orders mandate a review of compensation decisions by an independent
board committee. 82°
These measures, however, may not be the best means of address-
ing the problem of self-interest. The use of outside consultants has
been criticized as an ineffective means of providing objective decision-
making."' Consultants are hired and paid by executive management.
Due to these consultants' own pecuniary interests, their recommenda-
tions are not likely to stray far from the wishes of management. The
use of independent board committees, often referred to as compensa-
tion committees, is also a flawed means of providing objectivity in
compensation decisions. One commentator provided this critical as-
sessment of the objectivity of compensation committees:
The composition of these committees negates any pretense
of their impartiality . . . while the corporate environment in
313 BoK, .supra note 12, at 98.
311 Arguably, this ties the interests of outside directors more closely to shareholders, rather
than current corporate management. See, e.g., Elson, supra note 11, at 939 (also recommending
increased director terns lengths); Millstein, supra note 12, at 1436-39.
31'Barns, supra note 12, at 09.
31 'Arch Patton, Those Million-Dallar-A-Year Executives, in ExaarrtvE CoMPENSATION: A STRA-
TEGIC GUIDE FOR THE 1090s, 50, 54-55 (Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1991) (suggesting, among other
changes, the use of retired executives).
317 Millstein, supra note 12, at 1436-30.
318 See part 1.A.2 (2) .
"'See supra text accompanying note 105.
32'See supra text accompanying note 106.
321 110K, supra note 12, at 98; Barris, supra note 12, at 77; Elson, supra note 11, at 979.
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which these teams operate provides a playground for group-
think. It is not unusual for chief executives to sit on one
another's compensation committees in the capacity of outside
directors. These CEOs may approve increases for friends be-
cause they expect the favor will be returned, or simply be-
cause the corporate environment in which they operate ap-
proves of lavish spending on top executives. 322
The banking agencies do not appear to have embraced any other
specific measures of reform of the process of setting compensation.
Instead, they have focused on regulating the content of compensation
plans. This is not meant to suggest that the banking agencies are
exceeding their authority in this area. While Congress has provided
some indication that it is wary of regulatory intervention into the
content of compensation plans, 823 Congress has invested the regulators
with various means of doing just that.
Regulation of the content of compensation plans has the advan-
tage of taking the decision-making function away from self-interested
board members and placing it in the hands of the regulators. While
this eliminates management self-interest from the decision-making proc-
ess, it does not align decision-making with the interests of sharehold-
ers—the goal of the proposals for reform discussed above. Regulation
of the content of compensation plans has the effect of aligning the
decision-making process with the interests of the regulators. While the
regulators may have some interests in common with shareholders, e.g.,
limiting cost of operations, the regulators may not share other inter-
ests, e.g., maximization of profits through risk-taking.
The risk of allowing regulatory interest to influence or limit com-
pensation practices is that such intervention may undermine the ability
of banks to compete with their non-bank rivals who are not subject to
similar regulation. The best compensation practices evolve from inno-
vative business acumen and decision-making that can give a company
a competitive edge in attracting human capital.' 24
 The banking agen-
cies lack the expertise necessary to make complex compensation deci-
"V Barris, supra note 12, at 76. 01 course, some compensation committees are better than
others. The National Association of Corporate Directors has issued useful guidelines on the role
of compensation committees. Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Executive
Compensation: Guidelines for Corporate Directors, at 1-5 (Mar. 15, 1995).
323 Congress indicated that the safety and soundness standards set by the agencies may not
prescribe standards that set a specific level or range of compensation for directors, officers, or
employees of insured depository institutions." 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1(d)(1) (1996). See discussion
Supra part 1.13.2.
124 See supra part N.C.
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sions in this arena. As a result, the agencies should be reluctant to
remove this decision-making authority from the banks they regulate.""
The agencies and Congress could, however, take a more proactive
approach toward reforming the process of making compensation de-
cisions. Consideration could be given to proposals for reform that
focus upon that process."26 For example, Congress could require, or
the agencies could encourage, banks to compensate their outside di-
rectors, at least in part, in stock. 327 Reform of the decision-making
process could address safety and soundness issues"28 without negatively
impacting banks' competitiveness.
CONCLUSION
Congress and the appropriate federal banking agencies have a
legitimate interest in financial institutions' compensation practices given
the potential impact of such practices on banks' safety and soundness.
This regulatory interest, however, must be balanced against the banks'
need to attract, motivate and retain high quality employees." 2"
325 This should not he read to imply that the banking agencies should never !jinn the content
of bank compensation plans. When the current financial condition of the bank is seriously
troubled and unscrupulous bank executives decide to take what assets are left, regulatory inter-
vention preventing such practices clearly is in order. Effective reform of the process of decision-
making, however, should prevent bank executives from making and implementing take-the-
money-and-run decisions.
526 Om; of the proposals for reform discussed supra is aimed toward the content of compen-
sation plans, i.e., the proposal that. tied executive compensation to share price and other per-
formance indicators. This article does not suggest the application of this approach to bank
compensation practices for three reasons. First, lying compensation to, for example, stock price
has the disadvantange of focusing executive management's efforts on short term profitability
rather than long term value of the company. Second, efforts to find performance indicators
without the inherent flaws associated with the use of the stock price is particularly difficult in the
case of linancial institutions. See generally W. Donald Gough, Strategic Executive Compensation in
Financial Services, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: A STRATECIC GUIDE FOR THE I990s, .supra note
316. at 459-73. Finally, if tying executive compensation to share price. fin - example, is an effective
means for compensation, then hank management should he led to that method of compensation
as long as the decision -making process is not riddled with self-interest. ThcccI'ore, focus on the process
seems at the heart of reform.
s27 While members of the board of directors of national banks are currently required to own
shares of their bank's stock, the amount of stock involved is not significant enough to align the
directors' interests with that of shareholders. There is no requirement that directors receive stock
as compensation.
328 If the process for making compensation decisions at a hank was faulty to begin with (i.e.,
infused with self-interested decision-makers), then reform of the process would likely yield
different decisions (i.e., perhaps a lower annual salary for the CEO or perhaps a salary that is
contingent on certain performance indicators).
329 	analogy, the government's legitimate interest in automobile safety and reducing traffic
finalities is not addressed by outlawing the automobile. The resolution of traffic safety issues,
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Unfortunately, balancing these interests is a particularly difficult
task when the regulatory interest is greatest, i.e., as a bank's financial
condition deteriorates. 3" A bank's need to attract, motivate and retain
high quality employees arguably peaks when the bank is financially
troubled, while employees and executives concurrently have the great-
est incentive to seek employment elsewhere. As a practical matter, this
paradox pits the agency's heightened scrutiny and instinct to intervene
against the bank's need to maintain maximum flexibility during crisis
management. In such an environment, it is unrealistic to believe that
broad agency limitations upon compensation practices can be recon-
ciled with the bank's pending needs.
Moreover, a healthy bank, faced with arbitrary or burdensome
limitations upon its compensation practices (even if those limitations
apply only in the event of insolvency), may find itself unable to com-
pete for the quality leadership necessary to succeed or distinguish itself
in this highly competitive industry. Yet clearly, the regulators' intent is
not to threaten the long-term viability of healthy institutions. Also, the
regulators do not intend to remove from the banking industry, as a
means to achieve a competitive edge, the free market for human
capital and its associated resources, such as talent, experience, training
and innovation. For these reasons, the regulators must exercise caution
in limiting compensation practices for both healthy and ailing banks.
From a systemic viewpoint, regulation of the content of compen-
sation plans is most troubling because it puts regulators in the position
of making pure business decisions for banks. The federal banking
agencies, quite understandably, are ill-equipped to make these deci-
sions. Compensation, particularly executive compensation, often de-
pends upon trade-offs between assets the bank has at its disposal and
incentives which a current or potential executive perceives as valuable.
The potential variables include dissimilar items such as salary, bonus,
deferred compensation, stock options, retirement, golden parachutes,
including, !Or example, national speed limits, automobile bumper standards, side impact protec-
tion, and airbags, involves a highly scrutinized, ever-evolving process of debate, legislation, and
regulation contemplating the costs and benefits of certain measures. Arbitrary regulation of an
industry, whether the issue be automobile safety or bank compensation practices, is most effective
when tailored to solving a specific problem. Conversely, broad, sweeping "reform," implemented
in the wake of a post-crisis frenzy, may create more problems than it solves.
33°The agencies have the powers discussed in part I regardless of the financial condition of
the hank. See supra part I. The powers discussed in part II are added to their arsenal when the
bank's condition is troubled. See supra part II, The FDIC. has the added powers, as receiver,
discussed in part 111 , when the bank is put into receivership. See supra part III. The FDIC's
receivership powers, however, are not powers given to the FDIC in its regulatory role but rather
they are granted w the FDIC as receiver.
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life and health insurance, office perks, transportation and even vaca-
tion. Negotiating an individual's compensation package entails both
parties' assets and desires regarding these and other variables. For
example, an excellent joinder between a troubled financial institution
and a talented executive might entail a conservative (if not Spartan)
current compensation plan, with dramatic incentives (perceived as
generous, if not outrageous) including bonuses, deferred compensa-
tion and stock options, contingent upon the bank's future success."'
It is inimical to believe that the banking agencies are the proper arbiter
of the wisdom of such a relationship.
The regulatory interest in compensation practices is addressed
more appropriately by efforts to reform the bank's compensation de-
cision-making process. This would absolve the regulators from decid-
ing whether, for example, a severance package should compensate
employees for up to one year versus two years of annual pay.u 2
 Yet it
would permit the banking agencies to promulgate guidance regarding
the processes undertaken by banks to determine compensation. More
specifically, the agencies could craft requirements ensuring that the
business people responsible for these important business decisions
bear, in some formalized manner, the responsibility, risk and reward
for those decisions."'
If federal banking regulation focused upon improving the deci-
sion-making process, such that decisions regarding compensation were
made with the interests of the bank and its shareholders in mind,
rather than the interests of incumbent management, safety and sound-
ness issues could be addressed without negatively impacting a bank's
competitive edge.
831 For example, in 1980, Lee laccoca accepted a compensation package From Chrysler under
which he worked, for a time, for one-dolla•it-day, and eventually reaped a tremendous windfall
(from 1981 to 1986, he made more than $15,000,000 front Chrysler stock) when Chrysler sales
rebounded. See, e.g., Iacocca: I'm Probably Not Worth II, SAN Dteeo UNION-TRI RUNE, Apr. 23, 1986,
at A13. Consider also the $10,500,000 bonus given to Michael Eisner following a period of
spectacular financial success for Walt Disney after a number 4)1 disappointing years under prior
leadership. FRANK & COOK, supra note 12, at 67.
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 See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
"3 A statutory or regulatory requirement that banks compensate their outside directors, al
least in part, in stock, would represent a less intrusive and, perhaps, more effective means to
address certain compensation abuses. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
